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Jonah B. Gelbach

Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects
of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery
abstract. Many observers believe the Supreme Court’s Twombly and Iqbal opinions have
curtailed access to civil justice. But previous empirical studies looking only at Rule 12(b)(6) grant
rates have failed to capture the full effect of these cases because they have not accounted for party
selection—changes in party behavior that can be expected following changes in pleading
standards. In this Note, I show how party selection can be expected to undermine the empirical
usefulness of simple grant-rate comparisons. I then use a conceptual model of party behavior
that allows me to derive an adjusted measure of Twombly/Iqbal’s impact and show how to
estimate a lower bound on this measure using data from recent studies by the Federal Judicial
Center. My empirical results suggest that, depending on the nature of the suit in question,
Twombly and Iqbal have negatively affected plaintiffs in at least 15% to 21% of cases that faced
Rule 12(b)(6) motions in the post-Iqbal data window. Again depending on the nature of the suit,
these figures represent between one-fourth and two-fifths of the cases that fail to reach discovery
on at least some claims in the post-Iqbal data window.
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encouraging me to do empirical scholarship in civil procedure. In addition, I thank Dave Roth
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introduction
Rule 8 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] marks a notable and
generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of
a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff
armed with nothing more than conclusions.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly1 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal2 have sparked a broad debate
concerning federal pleading standards. In the parallel-conduct antitrust
context, Twombly overruled the Conley v. Gibson3 standard that a complaint
attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should
be dismissed only if no set of facts exists under which the complaint’s claims
could entitle the plaintiff to relief.4 Iqbal explicitly broadened Twombly to “all
civil actions.”5
A number of empirical studies have appeared concerning Twombly and
Iqbal’s impact on motion-to-dismiss dispositions.6 Opinions seem to be split
about the implications of these studies, with some commentators suggesting
that the body of evidence signals a major and ominous impact of heightened
pleading’s advent,7 especially in discrimination and civil rights cases.8 Others
argue either that it is a good thing that Twombly and Iqbal elevate pleading
standards, or that they do not actually change prior pleading doctrine.9
In March 2011, the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) released a detailed report
concerning Rule 12(b)(6) practice and adjudication, hereinafter the “original

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
Id. at 45-46.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all
civil actions,’ and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike.” (citation omitted)).
See infra Section I.C.
See sources cited infra notes 50-54.
See sources cited infra note 53.
For scholars applauding the perceived elevation of pleading standards, see, for example,
sources cited infra notes 55-56. For those arguing that Twombly and Iqbal did not depart
importantly from existing doctrine, see sources cited infra note 57.
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FJC report.”10 The FJC released another report in November 2011, hereinafter
the “updated FJC report.”11 The authors of these FJC reports characterize their
results as suggesting that there is little reason to believe that Twombly and Iqbal
have importantly affected Rule 12(b)(6) adjudication.12 Others have gone
further, like prominent Supreme Court litigator Andrew Pincus, who stated in
congressional testimony that the original report has “proven wrong” prior
“speculation” that Iqbal would greatly restrict civil justice access.13 Not
surprisingly given the stakes, critics of Twombly and Iqbal have raised
objections to the original report.14
In this Note, I make several contributions related to the measurement of
Twombly/Iqbal’s effects. First, I show that simply comparing the Rule 12(b)(6)
motion-to-dismiss grant rate under Conley with the Rule 12(b)(6) motion-todismiss grant rate under Twombly/Iqbal is of limited use in evaluating whether

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A
CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RULES (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/
Publications/motioniqbal.pdf. The FJC is the research and education arm of the judicial
branch and was established pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §620 (2006).
JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION OF RULE 12(B)(6) MOTIONS
GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
motioniqbal2.pdf/$file/motioniqbal2.pdf.
See, e.g., CECIL ET AL., supra note 10, at vii (“In general, there was no increase in the rate of
grants of motions to dismiss without leave to amend. There was, in particular, no increase
in the rate of grants of motions to dismiss without leave to amend in civil rights cases and
employment discrimination cases . . . . There was no increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate
at which a grant of a motion to dismiss terminated the case . . . .”).
Barriers to Justice and Accountability: How the Supreme Court’s Recent Rulings Will Affect
Corporate Behavior: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2011)
(statement of Andrew Pincus, Partner, Mayer Brown LLP), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-6-29%20Pincus%20Testimony.pdf (“Two years ago,
many asserted that the Court’s ruling in Ashcroft v. Iqbal . . . would dramatically restrict
plaintiffs’ access to court and that Congressional action was needed to overturn that
decision. That speculation has been proven wrong . . . .” (citing CECIL ET AL., supra note
10)).
See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in
Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1941294; Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative
Study of Iqbal’s Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012)
(manuscript at 22-35), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1883650; Lonny Hoffman,
Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Motions
To Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2011). As of this writing, I am unaware of any written
scholarly reaction to the updated FJC report.
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pleading standards have changed. An increase in pleading standards can
change the number of granted Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss (MTDs)
through any or all of the following four channels:
(i) Judicial behavior effects: More MTDs might be granted in cases that
would have MTDs filed under either pleading regime.
(ii) Defendant selection effects15: Defendants might file MTDs in cases
that they would have answered under Conley, and some of these new
MTDs will be granted.16
(iii) Plaintiff selection effects: Plaintiffs might choose not to file some
cases that they think will be either more expensive to litigate or less
likely to get to discovery. Since some of the cases plaintiffs choose not
to file as a result of increased pleading standards would have faced
MTDs under Conley and some of those MTDs would have been
granted, plaintiff selection will tend to reduce the number of granted
MTDs.17

15.

16.

17.

Party selection effects have a long history in the law-and-economics literature, with the
seminal work being George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
I am certainly not the first to recognize the likely existence of defendant selection following
changes in pleading standards. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing
Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 840 & n.70 (2010) (writing that a defense
attorney “commits legal malpractice if he or she fails to move to dismiss with liberal
citations to Twombly and Iqbal” and quoting “experienced litigator” Tom Goldstein as
“predict[ing] that Iqbal will be ‘the basis for an attempt to dismiss more than 50 percent of
all the complaints filed in federal court’” (citation omitted)); Scott Dodson, Pleading
Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 142 (2007),
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/dodson.pdf (“[O]ne thing is certain
after Bell Atlantic: it will . . . encourage[] defendants to file motions to dismiss, both in the set
of cases likely to be covered by its language, and also in the set less likely to be covered . . . .”).
As with defendant selection, I am not the first observer to note the possible presence of
plaintiff selection. See, e.g., ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 148 (2003) (observing that “strict pleading . . . reduces the probability of
filing”); Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 16, at 840-41; Memorandum from Hon. Mark R.
Kravitz, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Hon. Lee H.
Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 53 (May 2, 2011),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV05-2011.pdf
(“It is not possible to identify cases that would have been filed under earlier understandings
of pleading standards but were not filed for fear of heightened pleading standards.”).
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(iv) Settlement selection effects: The parties’ perceptions of the gains and
costs from litigation might either create or eliminate the possibility of
settlements where settlement surplus was either negative or positive
under Conley.18 Thus, the number of settlements might rise or fall, and
the number of MTDs granted might change as a result.
A critical consequence of party selection is that differences between the
Conley-era and post-Twombly or post-Iqbal MTD grant rates mix together two
kinds of effects: changes in judicial behavior among cases that would have
MTDs filed under either pleading regime, and selection-induced compositional
differences in the sets of cases that actually do face MTDs under the Conley and
Twombly/Iqbal regimes. Previous empirical studies have not taken account of
such potentially important changes in behavior. These studies typically
subtract the observed MTD grant rate under Conley from the observed MTD
grant rate under Twombly/Iqbal. But as I argue in Part IV, any observed
difference in grant rates across pleading regimes is consistent with large, small,
or even zero judicial behavior effects. Thus, the existing empirical literature
cannot settle disagreements over the effects of switching from Conley to
Twombly/Iqbal.
My second contribution relates to the fact that changes in pleading
standards affect litigants in ways other than through changes in judicial
behavior. For example, the discussion of defendant selection above explains
that if defendants file additional MTDs after a switch to the Twombly/Iqbal
pleading standard, more MTDs likely will be granted as a result. This effect
will harm the plaintiffs in these cases, in that the switch causes these cases not
to reach discovery. Conversely, the switch in pleading standards will help
defendants, for the same reason. We should want to measure such effects.
In Part V, I derive a measure of Twombly/Iqbal’s impact among a particular
set of cases, those in which MTDs are actually filed under Twombly/Iqbal.19

18.
19.

I discuss these issues, and the concept of settlement surplus, in detail in Part III.
To understand why my estimates relate to this particular set of cases requires one to
understand the methodological discussion in Parts II-V, which is too much to pithily
explain here. For the moment, though, the key aspect of the set of cases that have MTDs
filed against them under Twombly/Iqbal is that this set’s composition is fixed: it does not
vary with the pleading regime that is actually in place at any given moment. By contrast, it
does not make sense to speak of the impact of Twombly/Iqbal among sets of cases whose
composition does vary with the pleading regime. For example, consider three interestingsounding sets of cases: “cases in which a motion to dismiss is filed,” “cases in which a
motion to dismiss is granted,” or “all filed cases.” Party selection can cause the composition
of all three of these sets to change when the pleading regime changes. As a result there is no
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Among these cases, switching to heightened pleading causes two types of
effects. First, there are discovery-prevented cases—those that would reach
discovery under Conley but do not as a result of switching to Twombly/Iqbal.
Second, there are settlement-prevented cases—those that would be settled under
Conley but that, because of the switch to Twombly/Iqbal, plaintiffs will file and
defendants will challenge via successful MTDs. Even though these settlementprevented cases would not reach discovery under either pleading regime,
plaintiffs in these cases are worse off as a result of switching from Conley to
Twombly/Iqbal, since they do not receive a settlement under Twombly/Iqbal and
must also litigate MTDs that they wind up losing.
Taken together, discovery-prevented cases and settlement-prevented cases
constitute the set of what I call “negatively affected cases,” because these are
cases whose disposition leads to worse results for the plaintiffs who bring
suit.20 The negatively affected share is the ratio of (i) the number of negatively
affected cases to (ii) the number of cases that face MTDs under Twombly/Iqbal.
For selection-related reasons that I explain in Part V, the negatively affected
share generally cannot be calculated with real-world data. However, I show
how to use available data to measure a lower bound on it.21 This is an
important contribution, because it allows me to provide meaningful empirical
evidence concerning the effects on the parties of switching pleading regimes,
among cases that have MTDs filed under Twombly/Iqbal.
My final contribution comes in Part VI, where I use data from the FJC’s
two reports to estimate this lower bound separately among three categories of
cases. My results suggest that switching pleading standards affected plaintiffs
negatively in a sizable share of those cases that faced MTDs in the Iqbal period.
For employment discrimination and civil rights cases, switching from Conley to
Twombly/Iqbal negatively affected plaintiffs in at least 15.4% and at least 18.1%
of cases, respectively, that faced MTDs in the Iqbal period.22 Among cases not

20.

21.

22.

meaningful way to measure “the” impact of switching pleading regimes on such sets of
cases.
I do not mean to take sides in any normative arguments by using the adverb “negatively.”
One might as easily refer to the underlying concept as “positively affected cases,” given that
a switch in pleading regimes makes defendants better off in discovery- and settlementprevented cases. Twombly and Iqbal do raise important normative questions, of course; I
discuss these briefly in Parts I and VII.
A lower bound on one function’s value—in this case, the negatively affected share—is
another function with the property that the second function never takes on a value greater
than the value taken on by the first function.
In the October 23, 2011, draft version of this paper, Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to
Discovery? Conceptual Challenges in and Empirical Results for Assessing the Effects of
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involving civil rights, employment discrimination, or financial instruments,
Twombly/Iqbal negatively affected at least 21.5% of plaintiffs facing MTDs in
the Iqbal study period.23 These results tell us that Twombly/Iqbal negatively
affected a sizable share of those plaintiffs who actually faced MTDs in the
post-Iqbal period that the FJC studies.24
My findings raise important policy questions. Defenders of Twombly and
Iqbal cite high discovery costs as a reason to raise the pleading bar. Thus, a first
question is whether discovery-prevented cases (those negatively affected cases
that would have reached discovery under Conley but do not under
Twombly/Iqbal) are the cases for which discovery is especially expensive. Critics
of Twombly and Iqbal argue that the decisions create a Catch-22: in order to
meet heightened pleading standards, plaintiffs must already have information
that in at least some cases may be accessible only via discovery. And yet
Twombly and Iqbal allow the plaintiff access to discovery only if she has already
constructed a complaint with that information. Thus, a second question is
whether Twombly and Iqbal disproportionately affect the types of hard-to-plead
cases for which this Catch-22 is most salient. And what if the answers to both
of these questions are yes? While these questions are beyond my ability to
answer in this Note, they frame an agenda for future research concerning
pleading standards.
This Note proceeds as follows. In Part I, I briefly discuss Twombly and Iqbal
and the previous empirical literature, and I give an overview of the current
findings on post-Twombly/Iqbal MTD grant rates. In Part II, I lay down some
methodological bricks that form the foundation of the substantive results that
follow. In Part III, I present an economic model of pre-discovery litigation. I
first discuss a stripped-down economic model of litigation in which procedure
plays essentially no role. I then augment this model so that it is detailed

23.
24.

Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery (Oct. 23, 2011) (on file with author), I reported
slightly different effect sizes. I completed that draft before the updated FJC report was
released. The updated report allowed me to drop certain assumptions regarding re-filing
behavior following grants with leave to amend, which is the primary source of the difference
in estimates.
I exclude financial-instruments cases because there is good reason to believe that trends
involving them are due at least in part to the financial crisis.
In Appendix B, available at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/documents/gelbach
_appendix_b.pdf I derive formulas for and estimate standard errors for my lower bound on
the negatively affected share. Results show that estimates are statistically significant at
conventional levels for all three nature-of-suit categories that I consider.
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enough to yield several qualitative predictions concerning party selection
effects, which will be useful in succeeding Parts of this Note.25
In Part IV, I show that in the presence of party selection, observed MTD
grant rates might rise, fall, or stay the same, even when there are substantial
judicial behavior effects among cases that would face MTDs under either
pleading regime. An implication of this finding is that nothing of substance can
be learned, without more data, from differences in grant rates across pleading
regimes Further, I argue in this Part that even if they could be measured
correctly, judicial behavior effects are themselves a truncated measure of the
effects of changes in pleading standards, because they fail to capture important
direct effects of party selection.
In Part V, I introduce my alternative measure, the negatively affected share
discussed above. Unfortunately, unless we assume that there is no party
selection, this measure cannot be calculated using actual data. However, I show
that a lower bound for the negatively affected share can be established using
real-world data that are actually available.
In Part VI, I present my empirical estimates. In Part VII, I briefly discuss
future questions deserving empirical study. I then conclude.
i. twombly, iqbal, and access to discovery
In Section I.A, I begin by discussing doctrinal issues related to Twombly
and Iqbal. In Section I.B, I then argue that limiting access to discovery played a
critical role in the Supreme Court’s opinions in these cases. I also discuss
critics’ concerns that Twombly and Iqbal will harm plaintiffs. Finally, I canvass
previous empirical studies in Section I.C, including the FJC reports.

25.

Numerous scholars writing in the law-and-economics tradition have constructed economic
models of litigation. Examples besides Priest & Klein, supra note 15, include Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats To Sue, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD.1 (1996); Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519 (1997);
Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options
Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (2006); Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be
Dismissed? The Economics of Pleading and Summary Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 39 (2008); and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).
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A. Pleading Standards: Rule 8(a), Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part
that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: . . . (2) a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”26
This rule plays a critical role in the adjudication of Rule 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim: failure to make a “short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” is the basis for
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
Before Twombly, the leading Supreme Court case interpreting this standard
was 1957’s Conley v. Gibson, which held that “a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief.”27 While there has been some debate as to the faithfulness with
which courts honored Conley’s no-set-of-facts standard,28 there is no question
that Conley and the no-set-of-facts standard were the Court’s target in
Twombly.
Twombly was a putative class-action antitrust case filed by subscribers
against incumbent local phone carriers, including Bell Atlantic. The plaintiffs
contended that the carriers had violated section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act
by engaging in a conspiracy both to hobble competition and not to enter each
other’s markets following the deregulation of these markets by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.29 To prove a Sherman Act section 1 violation,
a plaintiff must establish that there was a “contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade.”30 But in their complaint, the plaintiffs offered
no direct reason to believe that such an agreement existed. Instead, they relied
on the existence of the carriers’ parallel conduct—the carriers’ simultaneous
failure to enter each other’s pre-1996 markets—and simply alleged, “upon
information and belief,” the existence of a “contract, combination or

26.
27.
28.

29.
30.

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562-63 (2007) (stating that “Conley’s ‘no
set of facts’ language has been questioned, criticized, and explained away” and that it has
“puzzl[ed] the profession for 50 years”); Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice
Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987 (2003).
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550-51.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
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conspiracy.”31 In his opinion for the Twombly Court, Justice Souter wrote that
the carriers’ behavior was “consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line
with a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally
prompted by common perceptions of the market.”32 Further, the Court found
that the averment of an agreement in the plaintiffs’ complaint was conclusory
and so was not entitled to the usual benefit of construction that courts
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) MTD owe to plaintiffs’ factual allegations at the
pleading stage.33
Having thus disregarded the plaintiffs’ allegation of illegal agreement, the
Twombly Court construed the complaint as alleging nothing more than parallel
conduct.34 Because existing Supreme Court precedent held that parallel
conduct is not per se illegal without additional reason to suspect the existence
of an illegal agreement,35 the Twombly Court concluded:
The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly suggesting
(not merely consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold
requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the “plain statement” possess enough
heft to “sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A statement of
parallel conduct, even conduct consciously undertaken, needs
something suggesting the agreement necessary to make out a § 1 claim;
without that further circumstance pointing toward a meeting of the
minds, an account of a defendant’s commercial efforts stays in neutral
territory.36
Lest there be any doubt as to Justice Souter’s distinction between
“possibility” and “plausibility,” he stated explicitly that “Conley’s ‘no set of
facts’ language has been questioned, criticized, and explained away long
enough. . . . [A]fter puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous

31.

32.
33.
34.
35.

36.

Complaint at ¶ 51, Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02
CIV. 10220), 2003 WL 25629874 (“Plaintiffs allege upon information and belief that
Defendants have entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive
entry . . . and have agreed not to compete with one another and otherwise allocated
customers and markets to one another.”).
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554.
Id. at 557.
Id.
See id. at 553 (“‘[T]he crucial question’ is whether the challenged anticompetitive conduct
‘stem[s] from independent decision or from an agreement’ . . . .” (quoting Theatre Enter.,
Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954))).
Id. at 557.
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observation has earned its retirement.”37 What was not clear, though, was
whether Twombly applied only to antitrust cases—or even just parallel-conduct
cases—or whether its reach was transsubstantive. The logic of the Court’s
argument can easily be read to involve the substantive details of antitrust law,
and some commentators continue to advocate reading Twombly that way even
after Iqbal.38
Enter Ashcroft v. Iqbal.39 The plaintiff, Javaid Iqbal, was held in a maximum
security “Special Housing Unit” as part of the U.S. government’s post-September
11 policy of confining persons “of high interest” in such facilities.40 Alleging he
was beaten and otherwise mistreated during his detention,41 Iqbal filed a Bivens
action against multiple parties, including FBI Director Robert Mueller and
then-Attorney General John Ashcroft.42 As Justice Kennedy characterized it in
his opinion for the Court, Iqbal’s complaint alleged that Mueller and Ashcroft
had “adopted an unconstitutional policy that subjected Iqbal to harsh
conditions of confinement on account of his race, religion, or national
origin.”43 Justice Kennedy wrote that these aspects of the instant complaint
were “bare assertions, much like the pleading of conspiracy in Twombly, [that]
amount[ed] to nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ of a
constitutional discrimination claim.”44
Justice Kennedy then went on to evaluate whether the claims he labeled
conclusory were plausible. He noted that the attacks of September 11 were
carried out by nineteen Arab Muslims who belonged to al Qaeda, whose
membership was largely Arab Muslim.45 Thus, the Court opined: “It should
come as no surprise that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest
and detain individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks would

37.
38.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 562-63.
For a persuasive argument to this effect, see Alvin K. Klevorick & Issa B. Kohler-Hausmann,
The Plausibility of Twombly: Proving Horizontal Agreements After Twombly, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW (Einer Elhauge ed., forthcoming 2012)
(manuscript at 201) (on file with author).
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
First Amended Complaint at 2-3, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809, 2005 WL
2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005).
Id. at 19, 31-33.
Id. at 4-5.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942.
Id. at 1951 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Id.
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produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the
purpose of the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims.”46 Indeed,
the Court continued, “[a]s between that ‘obvious alternative explanation’ for
the arrests and the purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent asks us to
infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion.”47
The Iqbal Court’s guidance concerning what qualifies as plausible is less
than rigorous: “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”48 Of course, one person’s
common sense might be another’s close-mindedness. Even as five Justices
might not have found “purposeful, invidious discrimination” a plausible
explanation for Javaid Iqbal’s treatment, it is not difficult to imagine that
others might disagree.49 Whatever Conley’s drawbacks, the “no set of facts”
standard is, on its face, at least objective: either it would be possible to adduce
facts entitling a plaintiff to relief based on a complaint’s allegations or it would
not be. By contrast, the subjective nature of “experience and common sense” is
self-evident.
The Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal have faced a fusillade of
criticism. Arthur Miller has written that the cases “mark[] a continued retreat
from the principles of citizen access, private enforcement of public policies, and
equality of litigant treatment in favor of corporate interests and concentrated

46.
47.

48.
49.

Id. Note that, according to the Second Circuit, “Iqbal is a Muslim and a Pakistani, but not
an Arab.” Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 148 n.2 (2d Cir. 2007).
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951-52 (citation omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567). The Iqbal
Court also held that Iqbal would need to establish more than just the unconstitutionality of
his arrest, since “[his] complaint challenges neither the constitutionality of his arrest nor his
initial detention.” Id. at 1952. Instead, his complaint rested on the allegation that detainees
categorized as being “of high interest” were confined in the Administrative Maximum
Special Housing Unit because of their race, religion, or national origin. Id. at 1952. The
Court then determined that Iqbal’s complaint “does not contain any factual allegation
sufficient to plausibly suggest [the] discriminatory state of mind” on the part of Ashcroft
and Mueller that would be necessary to meet the Court’s reading of Rule 8(a) as to the
policy that led to Iqbal’s confinement in the unit. Id. at 1952.
Id. at 1950.
See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Iqbal and Bad Apples, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 217, 227 (2010)
(“[T]he allegation that the detainees sent to the abusive maximum security prison unit were
disproportionately Arab and Muslim, combined with the allegations of actual incidents of
guards’ express prejudice alleged in the complaint, would seem to make out a more-thanplausible prima facie case that the underlying policy designed and implemented by Ashcroft
and Mueller targeted Arab and Muslim men for confinement under the harsh conditions of
the maximum security prison.”).
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wealth.”50 Characterizing Twombly and Iqbal’s results as “Pleading Left
Bleeding,” Kevin Clermont and Stephen Yeazell argue that “[b]y inventing a
new and foggy test for the threshold stage of every lawsuit, [Twombly and
Iqbal] have destabilized the entire system of civil litigation.”51 Judge Colleen
McMahon of the Southern District of New York wrote after Twombly that “no
one quite understands what the case holds. . . . We district court judges
suddenly and unexpectedly find ourselves puzzled over something we thought
we knew how to do with our eyes closed: dispose of a motion to dismiss a case
for failure to state a claim.”52 And a number of commentators have expressed
special concern about Twombly and Iqbal’s effects on civil rights claimants.53
Bills were introduced in both houses of Congress in 2009 with the aim of
overruling Twombly and Iqbal, though both stalled.54
Other observers have welcomed Twombly and Iqbal. For example, Mark
Herrmann and James Beck write that “out-of-control litigation prompted the
Supreme Court in Twombly to adjust the threshold pleading requirements for
unleashing the legal process.”55 On the basis of a mathematical model, Keith
Hylton advocates “rigorous assessment at the pleading stage,” which “provides

50.
51.
52.
53.

54.
55.

Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (2010).
Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 16, at 823.
Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the Lower Courts After
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 852-53 (2008).
See, e.g., Joshua Civin & Debo P. Adegbile, Restoring Access to Justice: The Impact of Iqbal and
Twombly on Federal Civil Rights Litigation, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y 2 (2010),
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Civin_Adegbile_Iqbal_Twombly.pdf (expressing
fear that Twombly and Iqbal might “create an undesirable safe harbor that effectively places
some defendants beyond the reach of civil rights laws”); Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of
Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119, 159 (2011) (“[C]ases in which state of mind plays a
large role or in which there are large information asymmetries, such as civil rights,
constitutional, and employment discrimination cases, are most likely to be vulnerable to
accusations of thin pleading.”); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil
Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 519 (2010) (“[T]he greatest impact of this change in the landscape of
federal pretrial practice is the dismissal of civil rights and employment discrimination cases
from federal courts in disproportionate numbers.”).
See Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009); Open Access to
Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009).
Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck & Stephen B. Burbank, Debate, Plausible Denial: Should
Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 145 (2009),
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/PlausibleDenial.pdf (opening statement of
Herrmann and Beck).
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an economic rationale for the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, and suggests that it may have a broader application than to the
circumstances of that case.”56 Still others have argued that Twombly and Iqbal
actually change relatively little in the pleading system.57 Finally, some
commentators have read the two cases as having important differences, with
Twombly having either changed little or made beneficial changes, by contrast to
a perceived negative effect of Iqbal.58
B. The Crucial Role of Discovery Access in Twombly and Iqbal
The underlying issue animating not only the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Twombly and Iqbal, but also the controversy surrounding them, is discovery
access. When discovery costs are asymmetrically high for defendants, a
plaintiff’s ability to get through the answer/MTD stage can be a powerful club.
Liberal pleading rules may have an in terrorem effect on defendants in these
cases, possibly inducing more, and more one-sided, settlements. The Supreme
Court’s opinions in both Twombly and Iqbal take note of this point; the
opinions make repeated and extensive references to the burden of discovery

56.
57.

58.

Hylton, supra note 25, at 42.
See, e.g., Barriers to Justice and Accountability: How the Supreme Court’s Recent Rulings Will
Affect Corporate Behavior: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2011),
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-6-29%20Pincus%20Testimony.pdf (statement
of Andrew Pincus, Partner, Mayer Brown LLP); Evaluating the Supreme Court’s Decisions in
Twombly and Iqbal: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11 (2009),
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-02-09%20Garre%20Testimony.pdf (statement
of Gregory G. Garre, Partner, Latham & Watkins LLP, and former Solicitor Gen. of the
United States) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal . . . are firmly
grounded in decades of prior precedent at both the Supreme Court and federal appellate
court level . . . .”); Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 31
(2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-36_53090.pdf
(statement of Gregory C. Katsas, former Assistant Att’y Gen.) (“Twombly and Iqbal simply
follow and apply settled propositions of black-letter law . . . .”); Daniel R. Karon, “‘Twas
Three Years After Twombly and All Through the Bar, Not a Plaintiff Was Troubled from Near or
from Far”—The Unremarkable Effect of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Re-Expressed Pleading
Standard in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 571, 572 (2010) (“Twombly is
remarkable only for its unremarkability . . . .”).
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 852 (2010) (“Iqbal applies a thick screening model that
aims to screen weak as well as meritless suits, whereas Twombly applies a thin screening
model that aims to screen only truly meritless suits. The thick screening model is highly
problematic on policy grounds . . . .”).
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borne by large corporations (as in Twombly) or government officials (as in
Iqbal).59
Citing a 1989 law review essay by Judge Frank Easterbrook,60 Justice
Souter argues in Twombly that not all “groundless” claims can “be weeded out
early in the discovery process through careful case management . . . given the
common lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery
abuse has been on the modest side.”61 Moreover, Justice Souter argues,
summary judgment is too late in the game for weak claims to be eliminated,
because “the threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to
settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings.”62 Still other text
from Twombly highlights the Court’s specific concern about the expense
discovery brings along in complex antitrust cases:
Probably, then, it is only by taking care to require allegations that
reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the
potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no reasonably
founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence
to support a § 1 claim.63
The concern about discovery burdens appears in Iqbal too, with Justice
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court repeatedly stressing the role of discovery.
Justice Kennedy places special emphasis on the Court’s “rejection of the
careful-case-management approach” in cases involving qualified immunity,
whose “basic thrust . . . is to free officials from the concerns of litigation,
including avoidance of disruptive discovery.”64 Finally, the epigraph of this Note
leaves no doubt as to the importance Justice Kennedy assigns to limiting

59.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Andrew Blair-Stanek argues that one can view a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal as “effectively just
the denial of discovery, followed by summary judgment based solely on the facts alleged in
the complaint.” Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly Is the Logical Extension of the Mathews v.
Eldridge Test to Discovery, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1, 36 (2010). Blair-Stanek notes that denial of
discovery finds a basis in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii), id., which allows a court to limit discovery if
it finds that “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635 (1989).
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (emphasis added and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (emphasis added and internal quotation
marks omitted).
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discovery in Iqbal. Despite its generosity and departure from “hyper-technical
. . . code-pleading,” Justice Kennedy writes, “Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the
doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”65
C. Previous Empirical Literature
I am aware of nine studies by other authors that attempt a quantitative
assessment of how MTD grant rates changed after Twombly or Iqbal.66 Two of
these are the FJC reports, which I will discuss momentarily. Four of the studies
consider only data from the pre-Iqbal period, so that they compare MTD grant
rates in the Conley era with MTD grant rates in the period between Twombly
and Iqbal. These studies are Kendall W. Hannon’s student note;67 University
of South Carolina School of Law Professor Joseph A. Seiner’s separate studies
of employment discrimination68 and of ADA cases;69 and a paper by University
of Chicago Law School Professor William Hubbard that is unpublished as of

65.
66.

67.

68.
69.

Id. at 1950 (emphasis added).
In addition, I am working on a paper that will link a formal, game-theoretic model of
pre-discovery litigation to empirical work similar to the results I report in Part VI. As of this
writing, a very rough draft is available as Jonah B. Gelbach, Selection in Motion: Measuring
and Estimating the Effects of Heightened Pleading (Nov. 3, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract =1884505.
Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811 (2008). Because it was
written before Iqbal, Hannon’s study provides limited guidance, though its sample
construction has the virtue of being less likely than most other studies to suffer from party
selection effects since “the vast majority of cases in this study involved a complaint that was
filed before the Twombly decision,” id. at 1831, and “the majority of the 12(b)(6) motions in
the study set were brought before Twombly,” id. Thus, Hannon argues that his sample
should be insulated from the sorts of selection effects on which I focus in this Note. Id.
Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment
Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011.
Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95 (2010). Seiner notes that the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Amendments Act of 2008 expanded the set of people
covered by the ADA. Id. at 108 (stating that the Act “explicitly seek[s] to ‘reinstat[e] a broad
scope of protection’” under the ADA (quoting the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-325, § 2(b)(1), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008))). As a consequence, one might expect to
see more ADA-related suits filed. Supplemental evidence provided to me by Joe Cecil of the
FJC shows that this is indeed the case. See infra note 167. Since the Amendments took effect
between Twombly and Iqbal, the composition of ADA cases may have changed for reasons
unrelated to changes in pleading doctrine. Thus, even in the absence of party selection, I do
not believe that Seiner’s Pleading Disability would be a reliable guide to the effects of
Twombly and Iqbal on discovery access, and I will not discuss it further.
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this writing.70 The other three papers include two by St. Thomas University
School of Law Professor Patricia Hatamyar Moore—an initial one that includes
a relatively small post-Iqbal sample71 and a follow-up study with a larger
sample of post-Iqbal cases72—and another by Albany Law School Professor
Raymond Brescia.73
All seven of these studies use data collected via searches of either Lexis’s
federal cases combined database (in the case of Brescia’s paper74) or one of
Westlaw’s case databases (for the other six studies75). The details vary
somewhat across studies, but the basic approach is to search case databases for
judicial opinions that contain “Conley,” “Twombly,” or “Iqbal,” as appropriate
depending on the time period of interest, together with terms indicating that
the opinion concerned the adjudication of a Rule 12(b)(6) MTD. These studies
typically include cases from a search window of between one and two years
before Twombly, between Twombly and Iqbal, and after Iqbal.
It is difficult to do justice to seven studies that used overlapping but
distinct data-gathering and empirical methodologies. However, as a rough
approximation, it is possible to draw a few basic general conclusions from these
studies:

70.

71.
72.
73.

74.
75.

William H.J. Hubbard, The Problem of Measuring Legal Change, with Application to Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 575, 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1883831. Like Hannon, see supra note 67, Hubbard uses
only cases filed before Twombly was decided in order to prevent selection related to
case-filing decisions from driving his results. See Hubbard, supra, at 31. In addition to his
empirical work, Hubbard also presents an interesting mathematical model of selection,
which he states “generates new predictions about the prevalence and success rates of
motions to dismiss . . . [that] are borne out empirically.” Id. However, Hubbard does not
prove that his model generates the predictions that he attributes to it, so it is not clear
whether they are model predictions or simply conjectures.
Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?,
59 AM. U. L. REV. 553 (2010).
Hatamyar Moore, supra note 14.
Brescia, supra note 14. Brescia makes the interesting point that there should not be judicial
behavior effects of Twombly and Iqbal in some cases with Rule 12(b)(6) motions, since not
all such motions will involve problems with plausibility. Id. at 5. Nonetheless, he finds that
“courts rarely found that a case should be dismissed because a judge considered there to be a
more plausible, and entirely legal, basis for the complained of conduct,” which is the
doctrinal cornerstone of Twombly and Iqbal’s change to pleading standards. Id. at 7.
Brescia, supra note 14, at 31-32 n.98.
See Hannon, supra note 67, at 1830; Hatamyar, supra note 71, at 584-85, nn.200, 202;
Hatamyar Moore, supra note 14, at 5, nn.25-27; Hubbard, supra note 70, at 28; Seiner, supra
note 68, at 1028, nn.128, 129; Seiner, supra note 69, at 116-17, nn.180, 185.
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They tend to find relatively little difference in MTD grant rates
across their pre-Twombly and post-Twombly/pre-Iqbal periods.76
They tend to find differences in the MTD grant or denial rate that
range between zero and ten percentage points across their Conley
and post-Iqbal periods,77 with larger differences for cases involving
civil rights of one type or another.78767778
They find either small or no changes in the rate at which MTDs are
granted without leave for the plaintiff to amend her complaint, and
sizable increases in the rate they are granted with leave to amend.79

As the original FJC report points out, coverage in case databases like
Westlaw and Lexis is incomplete, because not all decisions are included in
these databases.80 In addition, the report notes, “whether an order was granted
or denied may be related to its likelihood of publication.”81 Thus, one concern
about the aforementioned studies is that, party selection issues aside, their
samples may not represent the set of all cases that actually have MTDs filed or
adjudicated in either the Conley or Twombly/Iqbal periods.

76.
77.
78.

79.

80.
81.

See, e.g., Brescia, supra note 14, at 29-30; Hannon, supra note 67, at 1836; Hatamyar, supra
note 71, at 597-99; Hubbard, supra note 70, at 28.
See, e.g., Hatamyar Moore, supra note 14, at 7-8 (finding that the MTD denial rate “fell from
26% under Conley to . . . 17% under Iqbal”).
For example, in her earlier paper, Hatamyar Moore finds that grant rates for MTDs in cases
she codes as involving constitutional civil rights rose from 50% under Conley to 55% under
Twombly to 60% under Iqbal. Hatamyar, supra note 71, at 556. Her later paper shows a much
larger Conley-Iqbal difference, roughly twenty-three percentage points, when she follows the
FJC’s methodology and excludes cases with pro se plaintiffs, but her samples in this
comparison include just sixty-two cases under Conley and fifty-three post-Iqbal, so it is
unclear what to make of this result. Hatamyar Moore, supra note 14, at 11-12.
See, e.g., Brescia, supra note 14, at 36-37; Hatamyar, supra note 71, at 598 tbl.1; Hatamyar
Moore, supra note 14, at 7 (showing that the rate at which MTDs are granted without leave
to amend was 40% in both her Conley and Iqbal samples but indicating “[t]he percentage of
12(b)(6) motions granted in full with leave to amend increased from 6% under Conley to . . .
21% under Iqbal”).
CECIL ET AL., supra note 10, at 37 & n.47.
Id. After searching Westlaw’s “allfeds” database for thirty to forty orders that appear in the
FJC’s sample for each of three districts, Cecil et al. were able to match 87% of them for
the Eastern District of Arkansas and 82% for the District of Colorado, but only 18% for the
District of Kansas. Id. How much of the differences between results in the FJC report and
those in the studies discussed supra are due to such case-coverage differences is an open
question. Hatamyar Moore does write that when she tries to replicate the FJC’s sample
inclusion criteria, her “findings are broadly consistent with the FJC’s.” Hatamyar Moore,
supra note 14, at 3.
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A second concern is that it is unclear how to combine results involving
MTD grants with and without leave to amend. If plaintiffs never file amended
complaints (or defendants always challenge amended complaints again and
win grants without leave to amend), then the best way to measure MTD grant
rates would be to add together grants with and without leave to amend. On the
other hand, if plaintiffs always file amended complaints, and if none of these is
ever dismissed with prejudice, then the best way to measure MTD grant rates
would be to use only grants without leave to amend. One would expect—and
the updated FJC report confirms, as I discuss below—that the reality lies
somewhere between these extremes. Even if we could be confident there were
no party selection, then, it would not be clear how we should use the grant-rate
figures in the studies discussed above. This is especially problematic since
trends in the rates at which MTDs were granted with and without leave to
amend have differed noticeably.82
I turn now to the FJC reports. These reports combine the fruits of two
distinct data-gathering efforts, which I will refer to as the filing data set and
the grants data set. Both studies involve cases originally filed in, or removed
from state courts to, twenty-three federal district courts that “account for 51%
of all federal civil cases filed” in 2009.83 Rather than use legal reference
databases to find cases in which MTDs are adjudicated as in the studies
discussed above, Cecil and his coauthors searched the FJC’s database of civil
case docket sheets for codes that indicate filing of MTDs and orders resolving
them.84 They then used computer algorithms to search associated electronic
documents for phrases that indicated that the MTD in question involved Rule
12(b)(6).85
The filing data set includes all cases that meet the FJC’s inclusion criteria86
and were filed between October 1, 2005, and June 30, 2006 (what I will call the

82.
83.

84.
85.
86.

See supra text accompanying note 79.
CECIL ET AL., supra note 10, at 5. These courts consist of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia as well as, in general, “the 2 districts in each of the 11 circuits with the
largest number of civil cases filed in 2009,” though in some circuits the FJC instead was
forced to use “the court in the circuit with the next greatest number of civil filings.” Id.
Id.
Id.
The FJC excluded cases involving prisoners and pro se plaintiffs due to “the distinctive
characteristics and procedural requirements of such litigation, and because they were
concentrated in only 4 of the 23 districts” the FJC studied. Id. at 6 n.10. The FJC also
excluded orders resolving motions that responded to counterclaims and affirmative
defenses. Id. at 6.
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Conley period), or October 1, 2009, and June 30, 2010 (what I will call the Iqbal
period).87 Filings of cases involving financial instruments more than tripled,
and civil rights filings grew 18%,88 but the number of cases filed changed little
in the other categories the FJC considered.89 The FJC’s civil rights category
excludes Title VII employment cases, which the FJC considers separately.90
However, the civil rights category does include ADA cases.91 Given the
liberalization of ADA coverage arising from the ADA Amendments Act of
2008,92 changes in case and MTD filings in the FJC’s civil rights category most
likely mix together effects of Twombly and Iqbal and effects of the ADA
Amendments.93
Among filed cases, the rate at which defendants filed Rule 12(b)(6) MTDs
increased from 4.0% to 6.2% between the early and later periods.94 This is a
substantial change in filing rates: a 2.2 percentage-point increase in the MTD
filing rate constitutes a 55% increase from the Conley-period filing rate of 4.0%.
Thus, Twombly and Iqbal were accompanied by a substantively large increase in
the rate at which defendants filed Rule 12(b)(6) MTDs.
Next, I turn to the original FJC report’s grants data set, which includes
cases for which a judicial order was entered either between January 2006 and
June 2006 (the Conley period), or between January 2010 and June 2010 (the
Iqbal period).95 There were 700 such orders in the Conley sample and 1221 in

87.

88.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

94.

95.

When referring to the FJC reports, I use phrase “Iqbal period,” since the FJC did not collect
data covering the post-Twombly, pre-Iqbal period. Elsewhere I use variants of “the
Twombly/Iqbal period,” since both Twombly and Iqbal potentially raised pleading standards.
Table 1 of the original FJC report shows that there were 1524 cases involving financial
instruments in the FJC’s early period and 4790 in its later period; the figures for civil rights
cases were 4214 and 4976, respectively. Id. at 9 tbl.1.
Id.
Id. at 39-40 tbl.B-2.
Id.
See supra note 69.
In my own empirical work using the FJC’s data in Part VI, I exclude all ADA cases. I am able
to do this only because of the generous provision of supplemental tables by Joe Cecil, lead
author of the FJC reports.
CECIL ET AL., supra note 10, at 9-11. While each of the FJC reports contains results from
multivariate models that account for various case characteristics, I will focus my discussion
on the simple differences between the pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal periods studied; the
multivariate results are broadly consistent with the simpler differences in grant rates.
Id. at 5.
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the Iqbal sample.96 The FJC used recent graduates from the University of
Oklahoma College of Law to code these orders not only for the judge’s action,
but also for a variety of factors, including whether the challenged complaint
had been amended.97 Coders “indicated whether a motion was denied, was
granted as to all relief requested by the motion, or was granted as to some but
not all of the relief requested by the motion.”98
When the court granted relief, the FJC “also coded whether the plaintiff
was allowed to amend the complaint, and whether the motion eliminated only
some claims or all claims of one or more plaintiffs.”99 It is thus important to
remember that the FJC’s grant data concern claims rather than cases, since
some of a complaint’s claims might survive to discovery even as others will not.
Thus, my results using the FJC data should be interpreted as telling us about
the share of cases in which at least some claims are dismissed as a result of
Twombly and Iqbal.
The FJC found that the share of orders that denied in full a Rule 12(b)(6)
MTD fell from 34.1% to 25.0%; put differently, the share of orders that granted
some or all relief sought by defendants increased from 65.9% to 75.0%.100
These more favorable results for defendants are more than fully explained by
the (statistically significant) increase in the share of MTD orders that were
granted with leave to amend: this share rose more than 14%, from 20.9% to
35.3% (a statistically significant increase),101 while the share granted without
leave to amend actually fell about five percentage points, from 45.0% to
39.7%.102
For employment discrimination cases, the share of MTDs that were
granted as to some or all claims challenged increased from 67.4% to 70.6%,
with the difference being statistically insignificant.103 For civil rights cases, the

96.
97.
98.
99.

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 14 (author’s calculations from tbl.4).
Id. at 41.
Id. at 5.
Id. Observe that even a grant in full need not eliminate all claims against a defendant, or
even all of a particular plaintiff’s claims against that defendant, since the defendant might
challenge only some claims.
Id. at 14 tbl.4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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grant rate rose from 70.3% to 78.0%.104 As with other cases, the increase in the
share of MTDs granted is composed of a large increase in the share granted
with leave to amend and a smaller drop in the share granted without leave to
amend.105 Results for MTD orders are very different for financial instrument
cases compared with others.
In November 2011, the FJC released its updated report, which conducted
further collection and analysis of cases represented in the original report’s
grants data set.106 Unlike the initial report, which coded only the specific order
found via the FJC’s search of its database, the updated report follows all cases
included in the original grants study through September 1, 2011.107 Plaintiffs
submitted one or more amended complaints in 347 cases, just under two-thirds
of the 543 cases in the original report’s grants study that had MTDs granted
with leave to amend.108 Defendants filed renewed Rule 12(b)(6) MTDs in 209
of these 347 cases, roughly 60%.109 All but eighty of these MTDs were resolved
within the FJC’s follow-up period.110
For my purposes, the most important aspect of the updated report concerns
its results on whether MTD movants (presumably defendants) or respondents
(presumably plaintiffs) prevail at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage after the MTD filing
that the FJC considered in its original report’s grant study. By the FJC’s
definition, plaintiffs prevail when MTDs are denied, and defendants prevail
when MTDs are granted without leave to amend as to all claims. But when the

104.

105.
106.
107.

108.
109.
110.

The report’s table 4 has a typographical error, transposing the last two digits of the actual
pre-Twombly rate so that it reads 27.9%; I calculated a rate of 29.7% by dividing the number
of denied civil rights MTDs, 51, by the corresponding total number of MTDs considered,
172, which yields 29.7%. See id.
Id.
CECIL ET AL., supra note 11.
In personal communication, lead author Joe Cecil informed me that this date, which does
not appear in the updated report, was the end of the follow-up period. E-mail from Joe
Cecil, Lead Author, FJC Report, to author (Dec. 7, 2011, 11:18 AM EST) (on file with
author). The updated report also adds the caveat that, as a result of “idiosyncratic coding
practices by court staff” in some districts, the authors missed some orders in constructing
the sample used in both the original and updated reports; however, the updated report
states that the authors “presently have no reason to believe that inclusion of the missing
orders will change the findings of our study of outcomes of motions” and promises a
reanalysis once missing orders are located. CECIL ET AL., supra note 11, at 1-2.
Id. at 3.
Id.
See id.
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court grants an MTD with leave to amend, the plaintiff has the option to file an
amended complaint, so either party might ultimately prevail.
In the updated report, the FJC coded the movant as prevailing in a case
whose MTD had been granted with leave to amend if “the court granted the
last motion to dismiss in whole or in part and no opportunity to amend the
complaint remained. This included all cases in which the motion was granted
with leave to amend, but no amended complaint was submitted during the
time allowed.”111 The FJC coded the respondent in such a case as prevailing if
“the last motion to dismiss was denied, or . . . the respondent submitted an
amended complaint and the movant chose not to respond with an additional
motion to dismiss.”112 The FJC excluded from consideration eighty cases in
which the chain of events following the filing of the initial MTD the FJC
considered had yet to terminate in one of these ways.113
Neither movants nor respondents bat a thousand among cases that have
MTDs granted with leave to amend. The FJC report reveals that in all cases
considered together, movants ultimately prevailed in 56.4% of cases in the
Conley sample.114 This figure lies roughly midway between the 45.0% that have
MTDs granted without leave to amend115 and the 65.9% that have MTDs
granted either with or without leave to amend.116 The analogous figures for the
FJC’s Iqbal sample show that movants ultimately prevail in 62.7% of MTDs,117
while 39.7% of MTDs are granted without leave to amend118 and 75% of MTDs
are granted either with or without leave to amend.119 These statistics indicate
that movants in the FJC’s Iqbal sample ultimately prevail in a greater share of
cases involving MTDs granted with leave to amend than did movants in the
Conley sample.

111.
112.
113.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id. Of these eighty cases, fifty-seven involved pending MTDs, and twenty-three involved
cases in which the respondent still had the right to refile following an MTD granted with
leave to amend and had not yet done so. Id.
Id. at 7 tbl.A-1.
CECIL ET AL., supra note 10, at 14 tbl.4.
Id.
CECIL ET AL., supra note 11, at 7 tbl.A-1.
CECIL ET AL., supra note 10, at 14 tbl.4.
Id.
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ii. methodological underpinnings: potential outcomes
and judicial behavior effects
This Note’s empirical objective is to analyze the effects of changes in
pleading standards. Such analysis necessarily involves comparing observed case
outcomes under the Conley and Twombly/Iqbal pleading regimes. These
observed case outcomes are the result of deliberate decisions parties make.
Some of these decisions will be different as a result of parties’ behavioral
responses to the differing incentives under the two pleading regimes. To
understand the interaction of party selection and judicial behavior effects, we
must have language that allows us to separately characterize (i) the outcome
that would happen in a case if the Conley standard governed and (ii) the
outcome that would happen if, instead, the Twombly/Iqbal standard governed.
Following what is sometimes known as the evaluation methodology literature,
I will refer to these what-would-happen results as “potential outcomes.”
If we could observe each case’s potential outcome under both pleading
regimes, it would be a simple matter to measure the but-for effects of changing
the pleading regime. We do observe cases’ outcomes under the pleading regime
that actually governs at the time data are collected: a case’s actual outcome tells
us the case’s potential outcome in the pleading regime currently in place. Thus,
real-world data on MTDs adjudicated in the Conley era tell us about potential
outcomes under Conley for cases that wind up facing MTDs when the Conley
standard governs. Likewise, data on MTDs from the Twombly/Iqbal era tell us
about potential outcomes under Twombly/Iqbal for cases that wind up facing
MTDs when the Twombly/Iqbal standard governs. But we do not—and
cannot—observe any case’s potential outcome in the pleading regime that is not
actually in place at the time we collect data. Without making assumptions of
one type or another, we cannot know what would have happened to cases that
actually have MTDs filed under Conley had Twombly/Iqbal actually been in
place, and so on. This quandary boils down to the observation that it is
impossible to observe what would happen to the same unit of study in multiple
mutually exclusive states of the world—a challenge known in the evaluation
methodology literature as the fundamental evaluation problem.120

120.

The literature concerning evaluation methodology is vast. Its object is to measure the causal
“treatment” effects of changing a policy or other environmental behavior when only a single
actual outcome can be observed. In the absence of random assignment experiments (and
even sometimes in the presence of them), the fundamental evaluation problem cannot be
solved without making some behavioral assumptions. For example, in this Note, I partially
solve the fundamental evaluation problem by assuming that litigants are economically
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Suppose we assume that all cases in which MTDs are actually observed
being filed under Conley would also have MTDs filed under Twombly/Iqbal,
and vice versa. Then the difference in observed grant rates across pleading
regimes would identify the but-for impact of the pleading-standard switch on
judicial behavior for these cases. But what if the parties change their litigation
behavior when pleading standards change? Then as I discussed in the
Introduction, simple comparisons of observed MTD grant rates under the two
pleading regimes will mix together judicial behavior effects and changes in the
composition of cases that face MTDs under the pleading regime that is actually
in place.
To avoid such compositional problems requires finding a way to hold fixed
the set of cases whose outcomes we compare across pleading regimes. I will
show how to do that in Part V. My more modest objective in the current Part is
to develop two key building blocks that will help us get to Part V. In Section A
of this Part, I develop a taxonomy for the various pre-discovery postures that
cases can take as a function of parties’ choices.121 This taxonomy is critical to
the rest of my methodological analysis in Parts III-V (and thus to my empirical
work in Part VI). In Section B, I then give a precise definition to the concept of
judicial behavior effects, which will also play an important role throughout
Parts III-V in helping to distinguish the different channels through which
heightened pleading creates negatively affected cases.
Throughout this Part, and also throughout Parts III-V, I shall rely on a
number of simplifying assumptions for the sake of exposition. I shall assume
that each case involves a single plaintiff and a single defendant; that each case

121.

rational. That assumption turns out to provide enough behavioral structure to allow me to
measure an object of interest, the lower bound on the negatively affected share among cases
that face MTDs under Twombly/Iqbal. To learn more than this lower bound, we would have
to make stronger behavioral assumptions. For discussions of the fundamental evaluation
problem in the applied econometrics literature, see, for example, James J. Heckman, Robert
J. LaLonde & Jeffrey A. Smith, The Economics and Econometrics of Active Labor Market
Programs, in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 1865, 1879 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card
eds., 1999). See also Donald B. Rubin, Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized
and Nonrandomized Studies, 66 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 688 (1974), for an early and widely
celebrated discussion of the potential-outcomes approach to defining causal effects; and
Guido W. Imbens & Joshua D. Angrist, Identification and Estimation of Local Average
Treatment Effects, 62 ECONOMETRICA 467 (1994), for a careful and widely cited discussion of
treatment-effect heterogeneity in a potential-outcomes model.
Perhaps it would be more accurate to speak of controversies than cases, since some of the
“cases” I discuss will not be filed under one or both of the pleading regimes. For simplicity,
though, I will use the word “cases” generically to refer to any controversy, whether litigated
or not.
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involves a single claim; that Rule 12(b)(6) is the only type of MTD that can be
filed; and that when MTDs are granted, they are always granted without leave
to amend.122 Each of these assumptions lacks realism in one way or another.
But the main methodological points of my discussion would carry over to an
appropriately generalized discussion, and making these assumptions greatly
simplifies the expositional burden of dealing with multiple conceptually subtle
issues.
A. Developing a Taxonomy for Cases’ Pre-Discovery Posture
In terms of the parties’ actions, a case might have any of four pre-discovery
procedural postures. First, in “A” cases, the plaintiff files a complaint and the
defendant then files an answer. Second, in “M” cases, the plaintiff files a
complaint that the defendant attacks with a motion to dismiss, rather than
answering. Third, in “D” cases, the plaintiff never files a complaint; instead,
she “drops” the case without receiving any settlement. Fourth, in “S” cases, the
parties agree to settle the case at some time before the defendant must file an
answer or MTD. The S category includes both (i) settlements that occur before
the plaintiff files her complaint and (ii) those that occur after the plaintiff files
her complaint but before the defendant files either an answer or MTD.
Given the pleading standard actually in place, a case’s potential party
behavior is captured by the A, M, D, and S categories. But to understand the
causal effects of changing pleading regimes requires a taxonomy of the pair of
potential choices that parties would make when assigned to the different
pleading regimes. For example, consider the set of cases that plaintiffs would
file and defendants would answer under both pleading regimes. I will refer to
these as “AA” cases, since they belong to category “A” under both the Conley
and Twombly/Iqbal pleading regimes. Similarly, “MM” cases are those in
which, under both pleading regimes, plaintiffs would file complaints that

122.

In addition, I shall assume that filing MTDs and answers is mutually exclusive. This
assumption rules out various procedural maneuvers, like a defendant’s choosing to file a
post-answer Rule 12(c) motion, or to file both (i) an answer to two alleged claims and (ii) a
Rule 12(b)(6) MTD on the first claim only. A defendant might choose to do this out of fear
that, if the judge denies the defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the judge might then also
discount Rule 15(a)(2)’s admonition that the court should “freely give leave” to amend an
answer “when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). In any case, assuming that
defendants do not file MTDs and answers simultaneously is just a way to be able to use the
simple phrase “file an answer” rather than more cumbersome ones that cover all possible
eventualities, like “choose not to act in such a way as to forfeit one’s ability to prevent
discovery on the basis of the plaintiff’s failure to state a claim.”
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defendants would attack via MTDs. Cases that would be answered under
Conley but would face MTDs under Twombly/Iqbal are “AM” cases, and so on.
Because there are four potential outcomes—A, M, D, and S—under each
pleading standard, there are sixteen total categories. Figure 1 shows these
categories in a four-by-four matrix, with the rows given by Conley potential
outcomes and the columns given by Twombly/Iqbal potential outcomes.
Figure 1.

a taxonomy of cases in terms of their potential outcomes under the
conley and twombly/iqbal pleading regimes
outcome under twombly/iqbal standard
dropped
settled
answered
mtd filed

outcome
under
conley
standard

dropped

DD

DS

DA

DM

settled

SD

SS

SA

SM

answered

AD

AS

AA

AM

mtd filed

MD

MS

MA

MM

If party behavior were unaffected by switching pleading standards, then
every controversy would fit into one of the cells labeled DD, SS, AA, or MM.
To understand selection is thus to understand why some cases might instead
appear in any of Figure 1’s twelve other cells. Before I address that issue in Part
III, though, it will be useful to show how potential outcomes can be used to
precisely define the judicial behavior effects associated with a change in
pleading standards.
B. Judicial Behavior Effects
When I use the term “judicial behavior effects,” I have in mind the familiar
sense of but-for causation: cases that exhibit judicial behavior effects are those
in which a motion to dismiss would be granted under one pleading regime, but
not the other, in the (counterfactual) event that the case faced MTDs under
both pleading regimes. Notice that the concept of judicial behavior effects is
thus defined even for cases that would never have MTDs filed. For example,
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there may be judicial behavior effects in AA cases, even though defendants
would never file MTDs in these cases under either pleading regime.123
Consider the set of MM cases, which would have MTDs filed under both
pleading regimes. Figure 2 shows that this group of cases can be divided into
four subcategories. Let “MD” indicate the compound potential outcome that a
case would have a motion to dismiss filed and that the MTD would be denied.
Analogously, let “MG” indicate the compound potential outcome that a case
would have a motion to dismiss filed and that the MTD would be granted.
Then MM cases in which the MTD would be denied under Conley and also
under Twombly/Iqbal—that is, MDMD cases—belong to the figure’s top-left cell.
Similarly, MM cases in which the MTD would be granted under both pleading
standards belong to the figure’s bottom-right, MGMG cell. By definition, judges
in MDMD and MGMG cases would do the same thing under Conley as they
would do under Twombly/Iqbal.
As far as I know, no one believes that there are any cases in which Twombly
or Iqbal would lead to a more lenient pleading standard. Therefore,
Twombly/Iqbal’s judicial behavior effects operate in one direction only, via cases
in which a judge would (i) deny a motion to dismiss under Conley, if one were
filed, but (ii) grant a motion to dismiss under Twombly/Iqbal, if one were filed.
Therefore, the figure’s bottom-left cell is grayed out, indicating that there will
be no MGMD cases.
Figure 2.

illustrating the judicial behavior effect for mm cases
motion outcome under twombly/iqbal
denied
granted
motion outcome
under conley

123.

denied

MDMD

MD MG

granted

M GM D

M GM G

To illustrate, suppose that under Conley, MTDs would be granted in half of AA cases if
defendants filed MTDs in all these cases, and suppose that under Twombly/Iqbal, MTDs
would be granted in 60% of them if defendants filed MTDs. Then the judicial behavior
effect for AA cases would be ten percentage points (60% minus 50%), even though no AA
case would ever face a motion to dismiss under either pleading regime. Judicial behavior
effects are thus counterfactual objects—they depend on events that logically could happen,
regardless of whether those events ever do happen.
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We come now to the top-right cell of Figure 2, where the judicial-behavior
action is. For this cell’s cases, which I label MDMG, a motion to dismiss would
be denied under Conley but granted under Twombly/Iqbal. In other words, but
for the switch to Twombly/Iqbal, MTDs would be denied for these cases. Thus,
these are the cases that involve changes in judicial behavior. Since the number
of such cases will rise and fall with the total number of MM cases, it will often
be useful to think of the judicial behavior effect in relative terms, as the number
of MDMG cases divided by the total number of MM cases.
To make all of this concrete, in Figure 3 I provide two illustrative numerical
examples. In each example, there are a total of forty MM cases, and twenty of
these are MGMG cases—cases in which MTDs would be granted under either
pleading regime. In Panel (a), there are an additional twelve cases in the MDMD
cell, and eight in the MDMG cell. Eight divided by forty is 0.20, so switching
from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal would cause 20% of the forty MM cases in this
example to have MTDs granted rather than denied. In Panel (b), all MM cases
in which the MTD is denied under Conley also have it denied under
Twombly/Iqbal: there are no MDMG cases, and thus there is no judicial behavior
effect among MM cases in this Panel.
Notice that in both examples in Figure 3, the difference in grant rates across
pleading regimes equals the judicial behavior effect. In Panel (a), the MTD
grant rate is 70% under Twombly/Iqbal and 50% under Conley, so the crosspleading regime grant-rate difference is twenty percentage points—the same as
the judicial behavior effect. In Panel (b), the MTD grant rates are the same,
since no cases appear in the MDMG cell, so the difference in grant rates across
pleading regimes is zero—again the same as the judicial behavior effect.
Thus, if we could isolate MM cases and measure the difference in grant
rates across pleading regimes for them only, we would be able to calculate their
judicial behavior effect. Unfortunately, I show in Part IV that once we allow for
the possibility that there is party selection, there is no way to learn the judicial
behavior effects for any set of cases. I now turn to the analysis of party selection
itself.
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Figure 3.

two examples illustrating the judicial behavior effect for mm cases
panel (a): an example with a judicial behavior effect of twenty percent
motion outcome under twombly/iqbal

motion
outcome
under conley

denied

Granted

conley
total

denied

12

8

20

granted

0

20

20

twombly/iqbal
total

12

28

40

panel (b): an example with a zero judicial behavior effect
motion outcome under twombly/iqbal
conley
denied
granted
total
motion
outcome
under conley

denied

10

0

10

granted

0

30

30

twombly/iqbal
total

10

30

40

iii. party selection in an economic model of litigation
In Section III.A, I introduce a typical economic model of litigation, in
which procedure plays no role. A single plaintiff and a single defendant decide
whether to litigate or settle a single claim, and litigation involves no procedural
aspects.124 As such, this model is of no direct use to understanding the selection
effects of changes in procedural rules like those involved in Twombly/Iqbal. But
this model is worth a quick exposition, because it helps introduce some central
concepts in a simple context, which might be useful for readers who are

124.

See, for example, Priest & Klein, supra note 15, for such a model.
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unfamiliar with economic models of litigation.125 In Section III.B, I incorporate
pre-discovery procedural issues and discuss the ways in which a change in
pleading regimes induces party selection behavior. In Section III.C, I discuss
the ways in which a change in pleading regimes induces party selection.
A. A Simple Economic Model of Litigation
Parties will settle whenever there is a positive surplus from doing so.
Surplus is defined as the difference between the defendant’s net expected costs
from litigating and the plaintiff’s net expected gains from litigation. Each
party’s net expected gain (or cost) equals its gross gain minus (plus) its
litigation costs.
The plaintiff’s gross expected gain from litigation equals the probability she
assigns to the event that she will win if the parties litigate, times the gain she
expects if she wins.126 Suppose the plaintiff believes that (i) she has a 75%
chance of winning in litigation and that (ii) if she does win, she will win $1
million. Then her gross expected gain is 75% of $1 million, or $750,000.
Litigation is costly, though, so the plaintiff’s net expected gain is less than this
amount. Suppose the plaintiff’s expected litigation costs equal $100,000. Then
her net expected gain from litigation equals her gross expected gain of
$750,000 minus her expected litigation costs of $100,000, or $650,000.127
The defendant’s net expected costs from litigating equal the sum of her
gross expected loss given that the parties litigate and her expected litigation
costs. The defendant’s gross expected loss, in turn, equals her perceived
probability of losing if the parties litigate times the loss she expects when she

125.
126.

127.

Readers familiar with ideas like settlement surplus can skip ahead to Section III.B.
Note that “gains” here need not be confined to pecuniary returns; nothing in my analysis
prevents plaintiffs (or defendants, for that matter) from assigning value to cases based on
considerations of principle, revenge, or any other moral or emotional motive. All that
matters is that such value can be quantified by the plaintiff herself.
Notice that the variables that determine the plaintiff’s net expected costs are inherently
subjective variables; what drives party behavior according to the economic model is the
parties’ own assessments. This is true even if parties make “mistakes” in assessing the
strength or value of their cases, in the sense of being overconfident, or unnecessarily
pessimistic, relative to actual results in similar cases. Indeed, in the absence of such
“mistakes,” the economic model predicts there would be no litigation at all—since the
parties would agree on the values of all variables, they would settle all cases to avoid
litigation costs. For classic accounts of differences in party estimates concerning litigation
variables, see, for example, Posner, supra note 25, at 418-20; and Priest & Klein, supra note
15, at 9-24.
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litigates and loses. Suppose the defendant believes she has a 50% chance of
losing if the parties litigate, and suppose that she expects she will have to pay
damages of $500,000 when she loses. Then her gross expected loss is 50% of
$500,000, or $250,000. Suppose the defendant expects her litigation costs to
be $150,000. Then her net expected costs from litigating equal $250,000 plus
$150,000, or $400,000. In this example, the defendant’s net expected costs
from litigating are lower than the plaintiff’s expected gains from litigating.
There is no settlement amount such that each party will believe herself better
off than she will be if they litigate. Consequently, the economic model of
litigation predicts that the parties will litigate.
But now consider an altered version of this example, one in which the
defendant agrees with the plaintiff both that the plaintiff’s probability of
prevailing in litigation is 75% and that the plaintiff would win damages of $1
million if the plaintiff did win. Then, like the plaintiff’s gross expected gain
from litigation, the defendant’s gross expected costs from litigation would
equal $750,000. Adding the defendant’s expected litigation costs of $150,000
to this figure, we see that the defendant’s net expected costs from litigating
now would be $900,000, while the plaintiff’s net expected gain from litigating
would continue to be $650,000. The defendant thinks she has $250,000 more
to lose from litigation than the plaintiff thinks she stands to gain, so there is
now positive settlement surplus. In this simple example, the parties would
understand that litigating is equivalent to setting fire to a quarter of a million
dollars.128 As a result, the economic model of litigation predicts that the parties
would settle in this example.129

128.

129.

This view of settlement is not universal; for an impassioned critique of settlement, see
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). According to Fiss:
Consent is often coerced; the bargain may be struck by someone without
authority; the absence of a trial and judgment renders subsequent judicial
involvement troublesome; and although dockets are trimmed, justice may not be
done. Like plea bargaining, settlement is a capitulation to the conditions of mass
society and should be neither encouraged nor praised.
Id. at 1075.
Predicting the amount of the actual settlement requires a model of bargaining. The standard
model used in the economics of litigation has three main inputs: the plaintiff’s reservation
position, the defendant’s reservation position, and some measure of bargaining power. The
plaintiff’s reservation position is what she gets in the absence of a settlement—namely, her
net expected gains from litigating. The defendant’s reservation position is what she pays in
the absence of a settlement—her net expected costs from litigating. The economic model of
litigation predicts (i) that the plaintiff will never accept a settlement amount below her
reservation position, which is $650,000 in our current example and (ii) that the defendant
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As skeletal as this model is, it has enough flesh to cover the fact that partychosen case selection complicates the measurement of legal change. Changes in
legal rules, whether substantive or procedural, generally change at least one of
the main model inputs—parties’ perceived win probabilities, their expectations
concerning the value of gains or losses when the plaintiff wins, or their
expectations concerning the costs of litigation. The contrast between the two
examples above demonstrates that changes in these model inputs can affect
whether a case settles before formal adjudication. Consequently, changes in
legal rules change model inputs, affecting party behavior, so that the sets of
cases that are litigated differ across different regimes of legal rules. Simple
comparisons of adjudicative results, like how often plaintiffs win at trial,130
tend to mix together (i) the effects of changes in legal rules on cases that would
be litigated regardless of the choice of legal rules and (ii) changes in case
composition that result from the change in legal rules. Party selection thus
lurks beneath the empirical surface, laying a trap for researchers who try to
measure the effects of changes in legal rules using before-and-after
comparisons of variables that seem to measure outcomes of interest.
B. Extending the Model To Account for Pre-Trial Process
In this Section, I develop the simplest model that can account for changes
in pleading standards; note that I continue to maintain the assumptions stated
in the introductory text of this Part. Once a plaintiff has filed her case,131 the
defendant has three options before trial: settle the case for an amount the
plaintiff will accept, file a motion to dismiss, or file an answer and proceed to

130.

131.

will never agree to pay a settlement amount above her reservation position, which is
$900,000. Bargaining power determines where in the interval between $650,000 and
$900,000 the parties will settle. For example, if the parties have equal bargaining power,
they will split the difference—which is the $250,000 surplus—and settle for $775,000.
According to the economic model, if the plaintiff had more bargaining power, then she
would receive a settlement of more than $775,000 (though no more than $900,000), and if
the plaintiff had less bargaining power, she would receive a lesser settlement (though no less
than $650,000).
See Priest & Klein, supra note 15, for a classic discussion of win rates; for other examples, see
Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, The Selection of Employment Discrimination Disputes
for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects To Test the Priest-Klein Hypothesis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
427, 427-462 (1995); and Peter Siegelman & Joel Waldfogel, Toward a Taxonomy of Disputes:
New Evidence Through the Prism of the Priest/Klein Model, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1999).
Below I modify the discussion to allow plaintiffs to decide whether or not to file suit in the
first place.

2305

the yale law journal

121:2270

2012

discovery. A motion to dismiss may result in either of two possible outcomes: a
denial or a grant. If the MTD is denied, the defendant’s expected future costs
associated with the post-answer/MTD stage of the case will be the same after
the motion’s adjudication as they were before the defendant filed the motion.132
That is, the MTD’s adjudication affects only whether such costs will come into
play, not their expected magnitude. A granted MTD eliminates the targeted
claim, so the defendant’s subsequent costs associated with the claim would be
zero. I will assume for purposes of this discussion that when MTDs are
granted, they are granted without leave for the plaintiff to amend her
complaint.133 A rational defendant will file a motion to dismiss whenever the
cost of litigating the motion is less than the product of (i) the probability
the defendant assigns to the event that the motion would be granted and
(ii) the expected costs that the defendant avoids as a result of the dismissal. All
else equal, then, the greater the defendant’s perceived probability of winning a
motion to dismiss, the more likely she will be to file one.
Rational plaintiffs will not always file suit. According to the economic
model of litigation, they will do so if and only if their net expected gains from
litigating are positive. These net expected gains will depend partly on whether
the plaintiff expects the defendant to exercise her option to file a motion to
dismiss. If the plaintiff thinks the defendant will file a motion to dismiss, then
the plaintiff will recognize both (i) that she will have to bear the costs of
litigating this motion to protect her claim and (ii) that there is some chance
that a motion to dismiss will be granted, which would eliminate the net
expected gains from litigating discussed in Section III.A. Thus, a rational
plaintiff who expects an MTD to be filed must balance (a) the total costs of
filing suit and litigating the MTD against the product of (b) the probability the
plaintiff assigns to the event that the MTD would be denied and (c) the
plaintiff’s net expected gains from litigating when the MTD is denied. All else
equal, plaintiffs will be more likely to file suit when they perceive a lower
probability that a defendant’s MTD would be denied. Conversely, an increase

132.

133.

If the motion is denied, then the defendant’s net expected costs associated with the case will
depend on whether the defendant subsequently would settle the case or would litigate. It is
algebraically complicated to sort out the details of this decision, so I do not do so here. See
Gelbach, supra note 66, for a discussion of this issue.
It is straightforward, but again, somewhat complicated algebraically, to extend the model to
account for grants with leave to amend. The complication is that the effect of a grant with
leave to amend on the defendant’s costs depends on post-grant decisions by both parties—
whether the plaintiff would file an amended complaint, whether the defendant would file a
motion to dismiss that complaint, whether the parties might settle, and so on. I do allow for
this possibility in Gelbach, supra note 66; the main qualitative results are unaffected.
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in the MTD grant probability will reduce the number of cases plaintiffs are
willing to file.
C. Party Selection Effects in the Economic Model of Litigation
We can now explore the broad contours of how a change in the pleading
regime causes party selection. Suppose that a change in procedural rules
increases each party’s perceived probability that a motion to dismiss would be
granted—as many observers, and virtually all critics, think Twombly and Iqbal
do. Defendants will believe their returns to filing MTDs have risen. As a result,
under Twombly/Iqbal they will file MTDs against some complaints that they
would answer under Conley—there will be some defendant selection. In terms
of the case taxonomy I introduced in connection with Figure 1, the existence of
defendant selection means that there will be some cases in Figure 1’s AM cell.
To emphasize the presence of defendant selection, I redraw Figure 1’s four-byfour matrix in Figure 4, lightly shading the AM cell.
Figure 4.

taxonomy of case types in terms of party behavior, emphasizing
defendant and plaintiff selection
outcome under twombly/iqbal standard
dropped
settled
answered
mtd filed

outcome
under conley
pleading
standard

Key:

dropped

DD

DS

DA

DM

settled

SD

SS

SA

SM

answered

AD

AS

AA

AM

mtd filed

MD

MS

MA

MM

1. Box with lighter shading involves defendant selection
2. Boxes with darker shading involve plaintiff selection

I have also shaded Figure 4’s AD and MD cells, emphasizing that these cells
are ones in which the plaintiff (i) would file a complaint under Conley but
(ii) would drop the case under Twombly/Iqbal. Such plaintiff selection occurs in
cases where a switch to heightened pleading increases a plaintiff’s perceived
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probability that a motion to dismiss would be granted against her complaint.
The plaintiff’s net expected gains from litigating will fall if she thinks the
defendant might file an MTD. Some plaintiffs will choose not to file their cases
in the first place as a result of this reduction in net expected gains from litigating.
Recall that the economic model of litigation predicts the parties will settle
whenever there is a positive settlement surplus—whenever the defendant’s net
expected costs from litigating minus the plaintiff’s net expected gains is
positive. Increasing each party’s perceived probability that a defendant’s MTD
would be granted if filed reduces both the plaintiff’s net expected gains from
filing suit and the defendant’s net expected costs from litigating. Since both of
these “nets” fall, a switch to heightened pleading might either increase or
reduce settlement surplus in any given case. Heightened pleading therefore
might induce the parties to settle some cases they would have litigated under
Conley,134 but it also might cause settlements to break down in other cases. This
is why switching from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal could cause some settlement
selection, the catch-all term I use to refer to cases that would be settled under
one, but not both, of the pleading regimes. In terms of the taxonomy of cases I
introduced in connection with Figure 1, settlement selection cases appear in the
AS, MS, DS, SA, SM, and SD cells. In Figure 5, I highlight these cells with dark
shading to indicate that the cases they represent involve settlement selection.
Figure 5.

taxonomy of case types in terms of party behavior, emphasizing
defendant, plaintiff, and settlement selection
outcome under twombly/iqbal standard

outcome
under conley
pleading
standard
Key:

134.

dropped

settled

answered

mtd filed

dropped

DD

DS

DA

DM

settled

SD

SS

SA

SM

answered

AD

AS

AA

AM

mtd filed

MD

MS

MA

MM

1. Box with lightest shading (AM) involves defendant selection
2. Boxes with intermediate shading (AD, MD) involve plaintiff selection
3. Boxes with darkest shading (other boxes) involve settlement selection

This is true regardless of whether the defendant would have answered or challenged the
complaint with a motion to dismiss.

2308

locking the doors to discovery?

Economic models are useful in part because they help clarify the channels
through which behavior occurs. They are also useful in another way: they can
help us understand which sorts of behavior will not occur at all if agents are
rational. The economic model of litigation has this second property. It predicts
there will be no cases of certain types, which allows us to disregard them
moving forward. Consider the MA controversy type, in which (i) the plaintiff
would file a complaint under both pleading standards; (ii) the defendant
would challenge this complaint with a motion to dismiss under Conley; but
(iii) the defendant would answer the complaint under Twombly/Iqbal. The
economic model predicts that for no case would a rational defendant ever
follow this pattern of behavior. Holding constant the details of the case,
switching from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal will never increase a defendant’s net
expected costs from litigating, as of the time when the defendant must make
her MTD/answer decision.135 Thus, if it would make sense for the defendant to
prefer filing an MTD over filing an answer under Conley, it must also make
sense for her to prefer filing the MTD under Twombly/Iqbal. If defendants are
rational, then, the economic model predicts there will be no MA cases. A
similar, if somewhat lengthy, argument can be deployed to establish that there
will be no SA cases, either.136 Finally, it is possible to show that rational
plaintiffs will always drop cases under Twombly/Iqbal that they would drop
under Conley.137 All together, these results tell us there will be no cases of types

135.

136.

137.

This is true because the only effect of switching to heightened pleading is to increase the
probability that a motion to dismiss is granted in a case. So if the defendant answers, her
costs moving forward in the case will be unaffected by the change in pleading standards.
This argument is as follows. Since the defendant would agree to settle under Conley, the
settlement payment under Conley must be less than her net expected costs from litigating
would be if she filed an answer. The argument in note 135 establishes that the defendant’s
net expected costs from litigating, once the MTD stage has passed, would be the same under
Conley and Twombly/Iqbal. Therefore, the Conley settlement payment must be less than the
net expected costs from litigating under Twombly/Iqbal. Now, the settlement payment the
defendant must make to the plaintiff will not rise as a result of switching from Conley to
Twombly/Iqbal, because the defendant’s reservation position never worsens, and the
plaintiff’s reservation position never improves, as a result of this switch. Therefore, the
Twombly/Iqbal settlement payment cannot be greater than the Conley settlement payment,
which establishes that it must be less than the net expected costs from litigating under
Twombly/Iqbal.
The plaintiff drops the suit under Conley, so her net gain must be negative under Conley.
Since her net expected gain from litigating cannot rise as a result of the switch from Conley
to Twombly/Iqbal, the plaintiff’s net gain must also be negative under Twombly/Iqbal. Thus,
a rational plaintiff would drop any case under Twombly/Iqbal that she would drop under
Conley.
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MA, SA, DA, DM, or DS. I depict this fact by blacking out the cells corresponding
to these controversy types in Figure 6.
Figure 6.

taxonomy of cases, emphasizing “empty” controversy types and all
forms of selection
outcome under twombly/iqbal standard
dropped
outcome
under conley
pleading
standard
Key:

settled

dropped

DD

settled

SD

SS

answered

AD

AS

mtd filed

MD

MS

answered

mtd filed

SM
AA

AM
MM

1. Box with lightest shading involves defendant selection
2. Boxes with intermediate shading involve plaintiff selection
3. Boxes with darkest shading involve settlement selection
4. Blacked-out boxes denote case types that will not occur

Figure 6 captures all the qualitative predictions concerning party behavior
that can be made, without further assumptions, using the extended economic
model of litigation I have developed in this Section.138 Its implications include
the following:



138.

If the parties are economically rational, there will be no cases of the
MA, SA, DA, DM, or DS types.
Of the eleven remaining types of cases that are consistent with
economic rationality, only the AA, MM, SS, and DD types involve
no party selection.

With further assumptions, one can make further predictions. For example, it is possible to
rule out the presence of any SD or SM cases by assuming that the switch from Conley to
Twombly/Iqbal causes the plaintiff’s net expected gains from litigating to fall at least as much
as the defendant’s net expected costs from litigating fall. Under such an assumption,
settlement surplus cannot fall, so parties would always settle under Twombly/Iqbal if they
would settle under Conley. This assumption might hold in some cases, and it might even be
reasonable in most. But it is a real restriction on the way the parties’ beliefs change as a
result of switching from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal.
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In four economically rational types of cases—AM, MD, MS, and
SM—MTDs are filed under one pleading standard but not the
other.
There may be other forms of party selection, too—AD, AS, and
SD—which involve both plaintiff selection (AD) and settlement
selection (AS and SD).
Various gross effects of selection will cause the number of:
- cases filed to rise (SM cases);139
- cases filed to fall (AD and MD cases);
- MTDs filed to rise (AM and SM cases);
- MTDs filed to fall (MS and MD cases).

In addition, as I discuss in the next Part, there will be distinct selection
effects that cause the number of MTDs granted to rise and also to fall. Thus,
economic rationality of party behavior is consistent with observing any pattern
of net changes in the numbers of cases filed, the number of MTDs filed, and
the number of MTDs granted. This observation is the central problem that
makes comparing grant rates across pleading regimes problematic, a point to
which I turn in Part IV.
iv. what comparing grant rates across pleading regimes
misses
If we could separate MM cases from other cases in which we observe MTDs
filed, it would be simple to determine their judicial behavior effect. As Section
II.B showed, we could do so by subtracting the MTD grant rate among those
MM cases that are actually adjudicated under the Conley pleading standard
from the MTD grant rate for those MM cases that are actually adjudicated
under the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard. That is, if it were possible to
isolate only MM cases for consideration, the difference in MTD grant rates
across pleading regimes would tell us the judicial behavior effect for these
cases. But given the fundamental evaluation problem discussed in Part II—that
we cannot observe both potential outcomes for any case—it will be impossible
to distinguish MM cases from others that actually have MTDs filed under
whatever regime is in place. For example, among cases facing MTDs under

139.

The SM case category includes cases that would settle under Conley but be filed and face
MTDs under Twombly/Iqbal. Because some such cases would be settled before the plaintiff
files a complaint, switching pleading standards causes them to be filed and thus increases
the number of cases filed.
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Conley, some may be MM cases and others MD; among cases facing MTDs
under Twombly/Iqbal, some may be MM cases and others AM.
One “solution” to this problem is to ignore selection, assuming away the
possibility of having any MS, MD, AM, or SM cases to distinguish. If this
assumption were correct, then all cases with MTDs actually filed in either
pleading regime would be MM cases. Consequently, differences in grant rates
across pleading regimes would reveal the judicial behavior effect for MM cases.
But the discussion in Section III.C quite strongly suggests that there will be
party selection in response to perceived changes in pleading standards. Indeed,
empirical evidence showing a substantively large increase in the proportion of
cases that have MTDs filed indicates that there likely is considerable defendant
selection, at the very least.140
Unfortunately, as I show in this Part, the simple possibility that party
selection exists renders comparisons of MTD grant rates across pleading
regimes an unreliable measure of judicial behavior effects. A simple way to
demonstrate this fact is to show that for a given judicial behavior effect size
among MM cases, the MTD grant rate can rise, fall, or remain unchanged
following a switch from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal. Table 1 provides three simple
numerical examples that prove this claim. In all three examples, I reuse the
numbers from the example in Panel (a) of Figure 3: there are twenty MGMG
cases, twelve MDMD cases, and eight MDMG cases. In each example, then, the
judicial behavior effect of switching from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal is to cause an
additional 20% of MM cases to have MTDs granted.
In Example 1, there are no other relevant types of cases. Thus, as the
bottom part of Table 1 shows, there are twenty MTDs filed under Conley and
twenty-eight granted under Twombly/Iqbal. The observed MTD grant rates, in
percentage terms, are 50% under Conley and 70% under Twombly/Iqbal. In
Example 1, then, all is well: the cross-pleading-regime difference in MTD grant
rates is twenty percentage points (70% minus 50%), exactly equal to the
judicial behavior effect among MM cases.

140.
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Table 1.

actual
#mtds

settlement
selection cases

plaintiff
selection
cases

defendant
selection
cases

non-selection (mm)
cases

three numerical examples illustrating the sensitivity of cross-pleading
regime differences in mtd grant rates to party selection
example 1:
grant rate rises

example 2:
same grant rate

example 3:
grant rate falls

mgmg

20

20

20

mdmd

12

12

12

mdmg

8

8

8

mm total

40

40

40

jud. beh.
effect

20%

20%

20%

amg

0

7

3

amd

0

23

27

mgd

0

5

5

mdd

0

5

5

mgs

0

0

0

mds

0

0

0

smg

0

0

0

smd

0

0

0

actual pleading
standard

actual pleading
standard

actual pleading
standard

conley

twombly
/iqbal

conley

twombly
/iqbal

conley

twombly
/iqbal

granted

20

28

25

35

25

31

filed

40

40

50

70

50

70

grant rate

50%

70%

50%

50%

50%

44%
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In Example 2, I assume there is some defendant selection. There are a total
of thirty AM cases—those that (i) would have answers filed under Conley but
(ii) would have MTDs filed under Twombly/Iqbal. Of these, seven are AMG
cases, which means that MTDs would be filed and granted in these cases under
Twombly/Iqbal, and the remaining twenty-three are AMD cases, which means
that in these cases MTDs would be filed and denied under Twombly/Iqbal. In
addition, Example 2 involves some plaintiff selection. There are five MGD
cases, those in which (i) under Conley, the plaintiff would file suit and
defendants would file MTDs that judges would grant, and that (ii) under
Twombly/Iqbal, plaintiffs would drop. There are another five MDD cases, whose
MTDs in condition (i) would be denied under Conley, rather than granted. For
simplicity, I assume there is no settlement selection, which is why I have
assumed that there are no MGS, MDS, SMG, or SMD cases.
How many MTDs are actually granted under Conley in Example 2? There are
the twenty grants in MGMG cases, and there are an additional five grants in MGD
cases, so there are twenty-five total grants under Conley. What about MTD
filings? There are forty MM cases with MTD filings under Conley (twenty MGMG
plus twelve MDMD plus eight MDMG), and there are another ten MD cases with
filings under Conley (five each in MGD and MDD cases). Thus, we will observe a
total of fifty MTD filings under Conley. The MTD grant rate among these cases
is therefore 50% (twenty-five out of fifty). What about actually observed filings
and grants under Twombly/Iqbal? There are twenty MGMG cases and eight MDMG
cases, and there are another seven AMG cases, so thirty-five MTDs would
actually be granted under Twombly/Iqbal. There would be seventy MTDs actually
filed under Twombly/Iqbal—forty MM cases, plus seven AMG cases plus twentythree AMD cases. With thirty-five actual grants out of seventy actual filings, the
MTD grant rate actually observed under Twombly/Iqbal in Example 2 would be
50%—the same as would actually be observed under Conley. Example 2 has a
difference in grant rates across pleading regimes equal to zero, even though both
examples have the same judicial behavior effect among MM cases.
Now consider Example 3. The only difference between it and Example 2 is
that I have switched four cases from the AMG row to the AMD row: there are
now three AMG cases rather than seven, and twenty-seven AMD cases rather
than twenty-three. As a result of this tinkering, we now have only thirty-one
MTDs granted when Twombly/Iqbal governs, out of seventy actual filings. The
MTD grant rate actually observed under Twombly/Iqbal thus falls to 44%—six
percentage points below the grant rate of 50% observed under Conley. And yet
the judicial behavior effect among MM cases remains 20%.
Why does the difference in grant rates across pleading regimes fail to track
the judicial behavior effect among MM cases in Examples 2 and 3? Because the
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composition of cases that actually have MTDs filed differs across the two
pleading regimes. Look again at Example 2, where defendant selection causes
thirty AM cases to enter the set of cases with MTDs filed. Of these thirty cases,
only seven—or 23%—actually have MTDs granted under Twombly/Iqbal. This
is far below the 70% grant rate among MM cases. It is this discrepancy in
Twombly/Iqbal MTD grant rates among defendant-selection and MM cases that
drives down the MTD grant rate. That is how compositional changes due to
party selection confound our ability to measure judicial behavior effects using
the difference in actual MTD grant rates across pleading regimes.141
These three simple numerical examples support an important and powerful
general conclusion. Without more information about party behavior, neither
the direction nor the magnitude of the difference in MTD grant rates across
pleading regimes tells us anything about the magnitude of any judicial
behavior effects. On its face, then, the existing empirical literature on
Twombly/Iqbal cannot tell us much about judicial behavior effects.142
As dark a cloud as this analysis casts, it does have an ironic silver lining:
given that there is party selection, judicial behavior effects would be an
inadequate measure of the impact of switching from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal in
any case. Consider a case in which the defendant expects she will bear $250,000
dollars in net costs if she answers a complaint. If the defendant’s perceived
probability of winning at the MTD stage is 10% under Conley, she reduces her
expected net costs by $25,000 (10% of $250,000) if she files the MTD. If it costs
$26,000 to litigate a motion to dismiss, the defendant will file an answer rather
than a motion to dismiss under Conley. But if the defendant’s perceived
probability of winning at the MTD stage is 14% under Twombly/Iqbal, filing the

141.

142.

Consider a further tweak to Example 2, in which twenty-one of the thirty AM cases in
Example 2 would have MTDs granted under Twombly/Iqbal, rather than seven. In that
event, there would be forty-nine MTDs actually granted under Twombly/Iqbal (twenty-eight
MM plus twenty-one AM), implying an actual MTD grant rate of 70%. This modification
illustrates something that can be proved using tedious algebra: the presence of selection will
not prevent us from measuring judicial behavior effects when, and only when, the selected
cases would have the same MTD grant rates as MM cases under the pleading regime in
which the selected cases actually have MTDs filed. There is no reason to believe this
condition will hold in practice. Indeed, the economic model of litigation suggests good
reasons to believe that cases that do not always have MTDs filed will have different MTD
grant rates than cases that do when we hold constant the pleading regime actually in place.
Of course, authors working in this literature might have other objectives than measuring
judicial behavior effects as I have defined them. But I am unaware of any who have clearly
stated an alternative object of study, and my reading of the literature is that judicial behavior
effects are the object of estimation.
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MTD reduces her expected net costs by $35,000. Therefore, she will file an MTD
under Twombly/Iqbal, so hers is an AM case. Suppose the defendant is correct
that her case has a 14% probability of dismissal under Twombly/Iqbal. And now
imagine that there are 999 other cases just like our defendant’s, whose
defendants have the same beliefs she does. Roughly 140 of these cases (14% of
1000) will have MTDs granted under Twombly/Iqbal, compared to zero of them
that would have MTDs granted under Conley.
Even if we could measure the judicial behavior effect among MM cases,
then, stopping there would disregard the dismissal under Twombly/Iqbal of
roughly 140 AM cases, all of which would have been answered under Conley.
This example illustrates that there are other channels besides judicial behavior
effects through which a switch from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal affects the parties.
The same overall point applies to cases in which plaintiff selection and
settlement selection operate. Any measure of Twombly/Iqbal’s effects should
take account of effects operating through such channels.
v. what can be measured: bounds on the negatively
affected share of twombly/iqbal mtd cases
In this Part, I focus on the set of cases that would face MTDs under
Twombly/Iqbal. For short, I will refer to these cases as “Twombly/Iqbal MTD
cases.” This set of cases does not vary with the actual pleading regime in place,
a feature I have argued is critical to avoiding selection-induced compositional
problems. Moreover, unlike the set of MM cases, the set of Twombly/Iqbal
MTD cases is observable: cases that would face MTDs under Twombly/Iqbal
actually do face MTDs when the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard is in place.
In Section A of this Part, I define a new measure of Twombly/Iqbal’s effects,
the negatively affected share of Twombly/Iqbal MTD cases. The negatively
affected share accounts not only for judicial behavior effects among MM cases,
but also for cases affected through the party-selection channels I discussed at
the end of Part IV. Like the judicial behavior effect, the negatively affected
share has the rather unfortunate problem of being impossible to observe when
party selection occurs. But unlike judicial behavior effects, the negatively
affected share can be meaningfully bounded using observable data, even when
there is party selection of unknown types and magnitudes.
In Section B, I provide some numerical examples that illustrate how the
negatively affected share, and my lower bound on it, are related to various types
of party selection. In Section C, I discuss the relationship between the negatively
affected share and the discovery-prevented share. The discovery-prevented share,
which measures the share of Twombly/Iqbal MTD cases that miss discovery as a
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result of switching from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal, is of interest given the central
role that discovery-related issues have played in the debate over Twombly/Iqbal.
In Section D, I relate the lower bound on the negatively affected share to
the difference in grant rates across pleading regimes used in previous work. I
then show that the difference in grant rates across pleading regimes will always
lie below my lower bound when the number of MTDs actually filed rises after
the switch from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal. One can thus view the difference
between my lower bound and the cross-pleading-regime grant-rate difference
as a partial correction for net party selection into MTD filing.143
A. The Negatively Affected Share Among Twombly/Iqbal MTD Cases
We saw at the end of Part IV that switching to heightened pleading affects
case outcomes not only through changes in judicial behavior, but also through
party selection. Consider again Example 2 from Table 1. In that example,
switching from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal induces eight MDMG cases to have
MTDs granted as a result of changes in judicial behavior, while seven AMG cases
have MTDs granted as a result of defendant selection. A good measure of the
effects of Twombly/Iqbal should account not only for the first set of affected cases,
but also for the second. After all, both sets of cases wind up with MTDs granted
as a result of the change in pleading standards. Thus, both types of cases miss
discovery as a result of the switch in pleading standards.
These discovery-prevented cases are not the only cases that have MTDs
granted as a result of switching from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal. The switch to
heightened pleading also makes plaintiffs worse off in SMG cases, even though
plaintiffs are not prevented from reaching discovery in these cases. Under
Conley, plaintiffs receive settlements in these cases, and the plaintiffs do not
have to litigate a motion to dismiss. But under Twombly/Iqbal, these plaintiffs
must pay to litigate MTDs, which result in the dismissal of the plaintiffs’
claims. Thus, MDMG, AMG, and SMG cases all involve harm to plaintiffs caused
by switching from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal. Together, MDMG, AMG, and SMG
cases constitute the set of Twombly/Iqbal MTD cases in which plaintiffs are
negatively affected by the switch from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal.144

143.

144.

When we come to Part VI, we will see that even this partial correction is empirically
substantial. This correction is only partial because, when there is either plaintiff or
settlement selection, my lower bound is less than the negatively affected share itself.
All three of these types of cases are Twombly/Iqbal MTD cases. In addition, there are no
other types of cases in this set that would have MTDs granted under Twombly/Iqbal but not
under Conley (recall that there will be no DMG cases if plaintiffs are rational, see supra
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A natural way to measure the negative effects of Twombly/Iqbal on plaintiffs
would be to compute the ratio of (i) the number of MDMG, AMG, and SMG
cases to (ii) the total number of Twombly/Iqbal MTD cases. This ratio is the
negatively affected share of Twombly/Iqbal MTD cases.145 As I noted above, an
important feature of the set of Twombly/Iqbal MTD cases is that, since this set
is defined in terms of what would happen if the Twombly/Iqbal standard did
govern, it is the same regardless of which pleading standard actually does
govern. Consequently, the negatively affected share of Twombly/Iqbal MTD
cases is immune to selection-induced compositional problems.
B. Numerical Examples Illustrating the Negatively Affected Share
To make all of this concrete, consider Table 2. Its first column repeats the
made-up data on case types that I used in Example 2 of Table 1. Because there
are eight MDMG cases, seven AMG cases, and zero SMG cases in this example,
there are a total of fifteen negatively affected cases, as indicated in the row of
Table 2 labeled “Number of Negatively Affected Cases.” Under Twombly/Iqbal,
MTDs are filed in seventy cases—forty in MM cases, and thirty in AM cases.
Thus, the negatively affected share is fifteen divided by seventy, or 21%, as the
“Negatively Affected Share” row displays.
Unfortunately, we cannot use observable data to calculate the negatively
affected share, because we cannot separate MDMG, AMG, and SMG cases from
MGMG cases—MGMG cases observed under Twombly/Iqbal do not come with a
docket entry stating that they would have had MTDs filed, much less filed and
granted, had the Conley pleading standard been in place.146 But all is not lost,
because the difference in the number of motions that are actually granted does
provide important information.

145.

Section III.C). Thus, the negatively affected share is the right measure of the relative
importance of these cases among Twombly/Iqbal MTD cases. Recall, in addition, that my
focus on the Twombly/Iqbal MTD cases necessarily entails ignoring all cases that do not
involve a motion to dismiss filed under Twombly/Iqbal.
Formally, this share is given by

,

146.

where MTDTI is the number of MTDs filed under Twombly/Iqbal.
This is another example of the fundamental evaluation problem discussed above: it is not
possible to observe the same case simultaneously subjected to two different pleading
regimes. See supra text accompanying note 120.
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Table 2.

examples illustrating the negatively affected share, the lower bound
on the negatively affected share, and the discovery-prevented share

non-selection
(mm) cases
defendant
selection
cases
plaintiff
selection
cases
settlement
selection
cases
observed mtd
grant rates
negatively
affected
share
lower bound
on negatively
affected
share
discoveryprevented
share

example 2
20
12
8
40
20%
7

example 4
20
12
8
40
20%
7

amD

23

23

mG d

5

5

mDd
mG s
mDs
smG
smD
conley
twombly/iqbal
cross-pleading regime grant-rate
difference
number of negatively affected cases
number of twombly/iqbal mtd cases
negatively affected share
mtd grants under twombly/iqbal
mtd grants under conley
difference
number of twombly/iqbal mtd cases
lower bound on negatively affected
share
number of discovery-prevented cases
number of twombly/iqbal mtd cases

5
0
0
0
0
50
50

5
0
0
9
21
50
44

0

-6

15
70
21%
35
25
10
70

24
100
24%
44
25
19
100

14%

19%

15
70

15
100

21%

15%

mG mG
mDmD
mDmG
mm total
judicial behavior effect
amG

discovery-prevented share

The number of MTDs actually granted under Conley equals the number of
MGMG, MGD, and MGS cases, while the number actually granted under
Twombly/Iqbal equals the number of MGMG, AMG, and SMG cases.147 When we
subtract the number of MTDs actually granted under Conley from the number

147.

Recall that the discussion in Section III.C established that there will be no MA cases, and
thus no MGA cases, if defendants are rational.
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actually granted under Twombly/Iqbal, the result thus equals (i) the number of
MDMG, AMG, and SMG cases minus (ii) the number of MGD and MGS cases.148
Thus, the cross-pleading regime difference in the number of grants does not
isolate the number of negatively affected cases, given by (i), because we cannot
avoid subtracting the number of MGD and MGS cases in (ii) when we compute
cross-pleading regime difference. However, we do know one very important
additional fact: the number of MGD and MGS cases must always be at least
zero. Therefore, if there are any MGD or MGS cases, subtracting (ii) has the
effect of forcing the cross-pleading regime difference in the number of MTDs
actually granted to take on a value less than the number of MGMG, MGD, and
MGS cases. In other words, the change in the observed number of MTD grants
is a lower bound on the number of negatively affected cases. This is my key
result, because the ratio of the cross-pleading regime difference in the number
of MTDs actually granted to the number of MTDs actually filed under
Twombly/Iqbal is therefore a lower bound on the negatively affected share of
Twombly/Iqbal MTD cases.149
At this point it is useful to look again at the first column of Table 2. In the
block labeled “Lower Bound on Negatively Affected Share,” we see that there
are thirty-five cases with MTDs actually granted under Twombly/Iqbal, and
twenty-five under Conley, yielding a difference in MTD grants across pleading
regimes equal to ten. Dividing ten by the number of cases with MTDs actually
filed under Twombly/Iqbal, which is seventy, we have our lower bound on the
negatively affected share—14%, which is less than the 21% negatively affected
share for Example 2, as promised. It would be better to be able to determine

148.

Formally, the number of grants under Twombly/Iqbal equals MGMG+MDMG+AMG+SMG,
and the number of grants under Conley equals MGMG+MGD+MGS. When we subtract the
latter from the former, the number of MGMG cases drops out, and we are left with
.

149.

Formally, my lower bound may be written as

.

The fact that it is a lower bound means that NASLB ≤ NAS, where NAS is the negatively
affected share defined in note 145. When there are no MGS or MGD cases, my lower bound
exactly equals the negatively affected share. Thus, the lower bound and the negatively
affected share are equal when there is no settlement selection, which rules out MGS cases,
and no plaintiff selection, which rules out MGD cases.
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this 21% figure, of course. But the lower bound of 14% is a lot closer to 21%
than the difference in the cross-pleading regime grant-rate difference—which
is zero in Example 2.
C. The Relationship Between the Discovery-Prevented Share and the Negatively
Affected Share
Now consider Example 4, which appears in the second column of Table 2.
This example differs from Example 2 only in that it has some settlement
selection. In Example 4, there are a total of thirty SM cases—those that would
be settled under Conley but have MTDs filed under Twombly/Iqbal. Of these,
nine are SMG cases that would have MTDs granted under Twombly/Iqbal, and
the other twenty-one are SMD cases, which would have their defendants’
motions denied.
The calculations in the “Lower Bound on Negatively Affected Share” block
of Table 2 show that the actual negatively affected share of Twombly/Iqbal
MTD cases in this Example is 24%,150 while the lower bound is 19%.151 But the
main point of interest in comparing Example 2 and Example 4 has to do with
the rows concerning the discovery-prevented share. The number of discoveryprevented cases equals the number of MDMG and AMG cases, of which there are
fifteen in Example 2. Thus, the actual discovery-prevented share in Example 2
is fifteen divided by seventy, or 21%.152 In Example 2, my lower bound on the
negatively affected share is 14%, less than the discovery-prevented share. This
is not surprising, since there are no SMG cases in Example 2, which means that
all negatively affected cases are discovery-prevented cases.153

150.

151.

There are 24 negatively affected cases: 8 MDMG, 7 AMG, and 9 SMG. There are 100 cases
with MTDs filed under Twombly/Iqbal (40 MM, 30 AM, and 30 SM), and 24 out of 100
amounts to 24%.
There are 44 MTDs actually granted under Twombly/Iqbal, and 25 under Conley. The
difference between these numbers is 19, which amounts to 19% of the 100 Twombly/Iqbal
MTD cases.

152.

The discovery-prevented share equals

153.

Note that the discovery-prevented share can be written as
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By comparison, there are nine SMG cases in Example 4, so not all negatively
affected cases are discovery-prevented. The discovery-prevented share in
Example 4 equals 15%—fifteen AMG cases out of one hundred total
Twombly/Iqbal MTD cases. This is less than my lower bound on the negatively
affected share, which was 19% in Example 4. It can be shown that the crosspleading regime difference in the number of MTD grants will be less than the
number of discovery-prevented cases (MDMG and AMG) if and only if the
number of SMG cases—settlement selection cases that add to the number of
actual MTD grants under Twombly/Iqbal—is less than the combined number of
MGD and MGS cases, which are cases that, as a result of switching from Conley
to Twombly/Iqbal, exit the status of having MTDs granted.154 This condition
holds in Example 2, since there are no SMG cases, and there are five MGD cases.
The condition does not hold in Example 4, since there are nine SMG cases, five
MGD cases, and no MGS cases. In sum, we cannot say that my lower bound on
the negatively affected share is always a lower bound on the discoveryprevented share.
There is a simple condition under which there will be no SM cases at all.
That would imply there will be no SMG cases, which in turn is a sufficient
condition for my lower bound on the negatively affected share to be a lower
bound on the discovery-prevented share. But the condition that rules out SM
cases is not innocuous, and I am pessimistic that it could be verified
empirically.155 So, whether my lower bound on the negatively affected share
should also be interpreted as a lower bound on the discovery-prevented share is
really one for individual readers to answer for themselves, based on the
assumptions they are comfortable making.

,

154.

155.

and since SMG=0 in this example, DPS=NAS.
The difference across pleading regimes in the number of grants can be written as
MDMG+AMG+[SMG – {MGD+MGS}]. Thus, we will have ΔGrants≤ MDMG+AMG
whenever SMG≤MGD+MGS. Dividing both sides by MTDTI then yields the result that
NASLB≤DPS.
See supra note 138.
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D. Relating My Lower Bound to the Difference in Grant Rates Across Pleading
Regimes
In this Section, I show that the difference in grant rates across pleading
regimes and my lower bound on the negatively affected share have a simple
relationship. Recall that my lower bound is the ratio of the observed change in
actual MTD grants, ∆ MTD Grants for short, to the number of MTDs actually
filed under Twombly/Iqbal. It follows that the lower bound can be expressed as
(i) the MTD grant rate under Twombly and Iqbal, minus (ii) the actual number
of MTD grants under Conley, divided by the actual number of MTDs filed
under Twombly and Iqbal.156 The ratio in (ii) can be shown to equal (a) the
MTD grant rate actually observed under Conley, times the ratio of (b) the
number of MTDs filed under Conley to (c) the number of MTDs filed under
heightened pleading.157 Finally, by adding and subtracting the Conley MTD
grant rate, I obtain the result that my lower bound can be written as158

156.

That is, since ΔMTD Grants = MTD GrantsTI – MTD GrantsConley, we have the following
equation:

,
which can be rewritten as

,

157.

where the subscripts “Conley” and “TI” indicate the Conley and Twombly/Iqbal regimes,
respectively.
This claim follows by multiplying and dividing the final term in note 156 by the number of
MTDs filed under Conley and rearranging, i.e.,

,

158.

since the first ratio on the right hand side of the top equation is the Conley MTD grant rate.
To get this result, combine the results from notes 156 and 157 to obtain

.
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(1)

.

The first term, ΔGrantRate, is the difference in grant rates—which is the
measure that other studies use. The term GrantRateConley is the observed MTD
grant rate under Conley. The term MTDTI is the number of MTDs filed during
the Twombly/Iqbal period, and the term MTDConley is the number of MTDs filed
during the Conley period.
Thus, my lower bound on the negatively affected share of Twombly/Iqbal
MTD cases equals the difference in grant rates across pleading regimes—which
is what previous authors have used to measure Twombly and Iqbal’s effects—
plus the following correction term:
(2)
.
There is an intuitive explanation for the particular form of the second factor
in the correction term in (2). Suppose there were defendant selection (AM
cases), but no other forms of party selection. Since that would mean there were
no MGD or MGS cases, my lower bound on the negatively affected share would
exactly equal the negatively affected share itself. Therefore, the correction term
linking my lower bound on the negatively affected share to the difference in
grant rates across pleading regimes also would link the grant-rate difference
exactly to the negatively affected share. So, when there is defendant selection
only, the lower bound correction term fully corrects for selection.

Adding and subtracting gC then
yields

,
or

,
where I have used the fact that the ratio of MTDTI to itself equals 1. The right hand side of
this final equation is the expression in the main text, with ΔGrantRate ≡ gTI–gConley,
GrantRateConley ≡ gConley, and ΔMTDs Filed ≡ MTDTI–MTDConley.

2325

the yale law journal

121:2270

2012

In addition, if there were only defendant selection, the difference across
pleading regimes in the numbers of MTDs actually filed would exactly equal
the number of AM cases. Therefore, the ratio in the correction term in
(2) would exactly equal the share of Twombly/Iqbal MTDs that are filed as a
causal result of the switch from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal. It is easy to see that this
relationship does not generally hold when there is either plaintiff or settlement
selection.159
In sum, it makes intuitive sense to think of the ratio in the correction term
in (2) as a partial correction for defendant selection. In the special case when
there is only defendant selection, the correction term fully accounts for this
selection. When there is also plaintiff or settlement selection, the correction
term in (2) will include some effects related to these form of selection. The less
selection there is of non-defendant selection types, the more accurate this
partial correction will be. But holding constant the amounts of other forms of
selection, the correction term will tend to be greater the greater is the amount
of defendant selection.160
Finally, consider the sign of the correction term in (2). Both GrantRateConley
and MTDTI are necessarily positive. This means that the correction term will be
positive if the number of MTDs actually filed rises between the Conley and
Twombly/Iqbal periods. Because the FJC MTD report shows that the number of
MTDs actually filed did increase,161 the correction term is positive as an
empirical matter. It follows immediately that my lower bound on the
negatively affected share will exceed the difference in grant rates across
pleading regimes. Empirically, then, the difference in grant rates across
pleading regimes must be an even lower bound than the one I derived in
equation (1). I now turn to the empirical task of calculating how much the
difference between these measures matters.
vi. empirical results
In this Part, I estimate the lower bound on the negatively affected share for
each of three nature-of-suit case categories. In Section VI.A, I discuss the data I
use, which come from the two FJC reports I discussed in Section I.C. I then

159.
160.
161.

See the examples in Table 2 supra.
Note that if we knew that the only form of settlement selection was through SM cases—
settlement-prevented cases—then we could say the same thing about these as well.
See CECIL ET AL., supra note 10, at 9 tbl.1.
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report and discuss the resulting lower bound estimates. In Section VI.B, I
discuss possible threats to the validity of my estimates.
A. The FJC Data
In its original report, the FJC collected data on case filings, MTD filings,
and MTD grant rates; it studied the rate at which movants ultimately prevailed
in its updated study.162 In this Section, I first describe the statistics that I use
from the filing data set. I then discuss the statistics concerning the party that
prevails, which come from the grants data set as augmented in the updated FJC
report.
1. The FJC’s Filing Data Set
As I discussed in Section I.C, the original FJC report lists the number of
cases plaintiffs filed in twenty-three U.S. district courts during each of two
windows: October 1, 2005, through June 30, 2006, and October 1, 2009,
through June 30, 2010, to which I refer respectively as the “Conley” and “Iqbal”
study periods.163 For these cases, the FJC then counted the number of Rule
12(b)(6) MTDs defendants filed within the first ninety days of each case’s
filing.
Table 3 presents the numbers of case filings, Rule 12(b)(6) MTD filings,
and the implied Rule 12(b)(6) MTD filing rates from the FJC’s filing data set
for the three nature-of-suit categories I consider here.164 The first row contains
data for all types of cases pooled together, except those that the FJC coded as
involving financial instruments, employment discrimination cases, or civil
rights cases.165 I will refer to this category as the category of “total other cases.”
I exclude financial-instruments cases because the FJC MTD report shows that
there was an enormous spike in the number of financial-instruments cases filed
over the FJC’s study period,166 and this spike presumably is due to increases in
the underlying number of controversies in this category resulting from the

162.
163.

164.
165.
166.

See supra Section I.C.
See id. Note that I used the term “Iqbal study period” rather than “Twombly/Iqbal study
period” since the FJC data do not include cases filed or MTDs adjudicated in the period
between Twombly and Iqbal.
See Appendix A for details concerning these data.
I provide raw case counts by category in Appendix A Table 1 and Appendix A Table 3.
See CECIL ET AL., supra note 10, at 9 tbl.1.
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financial and housing crises rather than to changes in pleading standards. I
exclude civil rights and employment discrimination cases from the total other
cases category since I examine these two nature-of-suit categories separately.
The second row of Table 3 provides figures for employment discrimination
cases, and the third row provides figures for civil rights cases. These figures
differ somewhat from those that appear in the FJC report’s Table 1 because,
unlike the FJC, I have excluded ADA cases from this category due to changes in
ADA substantive law enacted by the 2008 ADA Amendments.167
Column (1) of my Table 3 provides the numbers of cases that were filed
during the Conley period. Column (4) provides the corresponding counts for
the Iqbal period. These figures imply that the number of total other cases filed
fell by 1.6% over the FJC’s study period. The figures also imply that the
number of employment discrimination and civil rights cases grew 2% and 7%,
respectively. All three of these figures are consistent with the model of selection
I discussed in Part III.168
Table 3.

data concerning case and mtd filings
conley period

167.

168.

iqbal period

The FJC included ADA cases together with civil rights cases (while analyzing Title VII
employment discrimination cases separately, as I do here). As I explain above, see supra note
69, including ADA cases will conflate behavioral responses to pleading-regime change with
the 2008 ADA Amendments’ broadening of ADA coverage. This broadened coverage
plausibly would lead to increases in the number of filed ADA cases for reasons wholly
unrelated to changes in pleading standards. As with financial-instruments cases, then, ADA
cases should be excluded from the analysis. I am able to exclude ADA cases only because of
the very generous efforts of Joe Cecil, lead author of the FJC reports, who kindly provided
me with several supplemental tables. These tables show that the number of ADA
employment cases filed increased from 268 to 378 between the Conley and Iqbal study
periods, while the number of other ADA cases increased from 449 to 851. These increases are
very large—41% and 89%, respectively—so it is important to exclude these cases from
consideration. I am very grateful to Cecil for his assistance. See discussion in Appendix A for
more details on the figures in Table 3.
The drop in case filings for total other cases is consistent with the presence of either or both
plaintiff selection effects and settlement selection effects. The increase in case filings for civil
rights and employment discrimination cases requires the presence of some SM cases that
would be settled before case filing under Conley but that, under Twombly and Iqbal, are
instead filed by plaintiffs and attacked with MTDs by defendants. There could also be
plaintiff selection so long as it is outweighed by the kind of settlement selection just
described.
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case type
total
other cases
employment
discrimination
civil rights

rule 12(b)(6) filings
(1)
(2)
(3)
cases
number
rate
(percent)

rule 12(b)(6) filings
(4)
(5)
(6)
cases number
rate
(percent)

39,912

1241

3.1

39,288

1968

5.0

3795

262

6.9

3871

349

9.0

3495

376

10.8

3747

454

12.1

Notes:
See Appendix A Table 1 concerning figures in columns (1) and (4).
See Appendix A Table 3 concerning figures in columns (2) and (5).
Figures in column (3) are rounded ratios of column (2) to column (1).
Figures in column (6) are rounded ratios of column (5) to column (4).

Columns (3) and (6) of Table 3 provide the fraction of filed cases in which
the FJC reports that the defendant filed MTDs in each period. For all three
nature-of-suit categories, the Rule 12(b)(6) MTD filing rate increased between
the FJC’s two study periods. Among total other cases, the filing rate increased
from 3.1% to 5.0%. For employment discrimination and civil rights cases, the
12(b)(6) MTD filing rate increased from 6.9% to 9.0 percent, and from 10.8%
to 12.1%, respectively.
2. The FJC’s Grants Data Set
The grants data in the original FJC report included data on 1921 judicial
orders.169 Some of these involved grants with leave to amend. As I discussed in
Section I.C, when a Rule 12(b)(6) MTD is granted with leave to amend, the
plaintiff may file an amended complaint, which the defendant may challenge
with a new Rule 12(b)(6) MTD, and so on. The FJC’s original report shows
that MTDs are granted with leave to amend in a nontrivial share of cases, and
it also shows that the with-leave-to-amend disposition category became more
common between the Conley and Iqbal study periods.170
My methodological discussion, on the other hand, focuses on MTD grants
that terminate a plaintiff’s claim, leaving open the question of how to deal with
MTDs that are granted with leave to amend. The FJC’s updated report answers
this question by following all cases that had a Rule 12(b)(6) motion granted

169.
170.

See CECIL ET AL., supra note 10, at 14 tbl.4.
See supra text accompanying notes 114-119.
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with leave to amend to determine a definitive resolution to the MTD stage of
litigation. The FJC was able to do so in all but eighty of the cases represented
in the original report’s grants data set.171
Table A-1 of the updated report provides data on the party who “ultimately
prevailed” in cases in which the FJC read and coded an order resolving a
motion to dismiss.172 According to the FJC’s coding scheme, the movant
prevailed when a court “granted the last motion to dismiss in whole or in part
and no opportunity to amend the complaint remained.”173 This definition
covers both (i) grants without leave to amend and (ii) cases in which the court
gave leave to amend but in which the respondent did not file a timely amended
complaint.174 The FJC coded the respondent as prevailing when “the last
motion to dismiss was denied, or [when] . . . the respondent submitted an
amended complaint and the movant chose not to respond with an additional
motion to dismiss.”175
When the movant prevails according to the FJC’s definition, the
respondent’s claim is terminated, eliminating all access to discovery and future
litigation costs for the claims involved. And when the respondent prevails, she
will have access to discovery.176 As such, the FJC’s definition of a movant’s
having prevailed corresponds directly to the conceptual role that an MTD grant
played in the methodological discussion in Parts II-V. Consequently, I will use
the movant’s rate of prevailing as my measure of the grant rate for purposes of
estimating my lower bound on the negatively affected share of Twombly/Iqbal
MTD cases.
It is important to emphasize that the FJC codes a movant as prevailing if
she prevailed on any of the claims she challenged via an initial Rule 12(b)(6)

171.

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

The updated report explains that fifty-two of the orders in the grants data set corresponded
to cases represented more than once in the original grants study, due to an earlier MTD
granted with leave to amend that was “followed by an amended complaint, a motion to
dismiss the amended complaint, and an order resolving the motion.” CECIL ET AL., supra
note 11, at 3 n.4. Thus, there were actually 1869 unique cases represented in the original
report’s grant study.
Id. at 7 tbl.A-1.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Of course, the movant could try to limit or eliminate discovery access via the same set of
Rule 26 procedures as are available in the absence of MTDs.
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MTD.177 This is the right definition of “prevailing” to use empirically. To see
why, just consider Iqbal. As Justice Kennedy noted, John Ashcroft and Robert
Mueller were only two of many defendants whom Javaid Iqbal sued in his
complaint alleging twenty-one causes of action.178 The Supreme Court’s
holding in Iqbal thus eliminated only defendants Ashcroft and Mueller from
the litigation, and Justice Kennedy’s opinion explicitly disclaimed any opinion
as to “the sufficiency of respondent’s complaint against the defendants who are
not before us.”179 Thus, Iqbal itself falls into the category of cases in which the
Rule 12(b)(6) MTD was granted as to only some of the plaintiff’s claims.
I list statistics concerning the percentage of cases in which the movant
prevails in Table 4.180 The first two columns show this percentage for the
Conley and Iqbal study periods, and the third column shows the change across
pleading regimes. The movant prevailed in 55.2% of total other cases under
Conley, a figure that rose to 56.3% under Twombly and Iqbal. Roughly speaking,
then, there was no change in the observed share of cases whose claims all
ultimately reached discovery despite having faced a Rule 12(b)(6) MTD.
Recall, though, that in the presence of defendant selection, even such a null
finding need not contradict the hypothesis that Twombly and Iqbal have
harmed plaintiffs or reduced discovery access.181
Table 4.

percentage of cases in which movant prevails

177.
178.
179.
180.

181.

case type

conley

iqbal

change

total other cases

55.2

56.3

1.1

employment discrimination

60.9

61.1

0.2

civil rights

60.3

68.1

7.8

The FJC could have instead coded movants as prevailing only if they prevailed on all claims
challenged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1943 (2009).
Id. at 1952.
For the employment discrimination cases, these figures come from the “Movant” row of
Table A-1 of the FJC’s updated report. CECIL ET AL., supra note 11, at 7 tbl.A-1. For the civil
rights cases and total other cases categories, the reported figures are my own calculations
based on that table and on supplemental tables kindly provided by Joe Cecil to allow me to
exclude (the small number of) orders relating to ADA cases. I provide the raw count of cases
represented in each category in Appendix A. See infra Appendix A tbl.4.
See Example 2, supra Table 1 and Table 2, on exactly this point.

2331

the yale law journal

121:2270

2012

Table 4’s second row presents the movant’s rate of prevailing in
employment discrimination cases. In each period, roughly 61% of movants
prevailed in employment discrimination cases after filing a Rule 12(b)(6)
MTD. Finally, the results for civil rights cases show that after Twombly and
Iqbal had taken effect, there was about an eight-point uptick in the percentage
of cases in which movants prevailed after filing Rule 12(b)(6) MTDs.
3. Calculating the Lower Bound
I now use data from Table 3 and Table 4 to calculate the correction term
from equation (2). Column (1) of Table 5 reports the change in the number of
MTDs filed between the Conley and Iqbal study periods. For each nature-ofsuit category, this change equals the column (5) entry from Table 3 minus the
column (2) entry from Table 3; for example, there were 727 more MTDs
among total other cases in the Iqbal period than during the Conley period.
Column (2) of Table 5 reports the number of MTDs that were filed in each
nature-of-suit category during the Iqbal period.
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Table 5.

calculating the correction term

case type

total other
cases
employment
discrimination
cases
civil rights
cases

(1)
change in
mtd
filings

(2)
number of
mtd filings,
iqbal period

(3)
ratio of
(1) to (2)

(4)
movantprevailed
rate under
conley

product
of
(3) and (4)

727

1968

0.37

55.2

20.4

87

349

0.25

60.9

15.2

78

454

0.17

60.3

10.3

Table 5’s column (3) is the ratio of the table’s column (1) to its column (2).
This ratio is the part of the correction term I discussed in detail at the end of
Section V.D. Other things equal, larger values of this ratio tend to indicate the
presence of more defendant selection.182 The larger the ratio is, other things
equal, the greater will be the correction term that must be added to the
difference in grant rates across pleading regimes in order to estimate my lower
bound on the negatively affected share. The ratio equals 0.37 for total other
cases, 0.25 for employment discrimination cases, and 0.17 for civil rights cases.
That suggests we can expect the correction term from equation (2) to be
greatest for total other cases and least for civil rights cases.
In column (4) of Table 5, I repeat the Conley-period rate at which movants
prevail, which I also reported in the first column of Table 4. The correction
term in equation (2) is the product of this rate and the ratio in column (3) of
Table 5. This term is what we must add to the difference in the movantprevails rate to obtain the lower bound on the negatively affected share. I
report the product of columns (3) and (4) for each nature-of-suit category in
the final column of Table 5, which shows that the correction term is 20.4
percentage points for total other cases, 15.2 points for employment
discrimination cases, and 10.3 points for civil rights cases. As predicted, then,
the correction term rises with the ratio in column (3). The greater the apparent
amount of selection into MTD filing, the greater is the term necessary to

182.

Or also, possibly, more settlement selection of the SM form.
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correct for it in bounding the negatively affected share of Twombly/Iqbal MTD
cases.
In Table 6, I report the components necessary to calculate my lower
bounds on the negatively affected share. The first column repeats the difference
across pleading regimes in the rate at which movants prevail, which I originally
reported in Table 4. The second column of Table 6 reports the correction term
just calculated in Table 5. Finally, the third column of Table 6 reports the sum
of the first two columns. For each of the three nature-of-suit categories, this
sum is my lower bound on the negatively affected share of Twombly/Iqbal
MTD cases.
Table 6.

lower bounds on the negatively affected share of cases among those
with mtds filed under twombly and iqbal

case type

change in the
movant-prevails
share

correction
term

implied lower
bound on
negatively affected
share

total other cases

1.1

20.4

21.5

0.2

15.2

15.4

7.8

10.3

18.1

employment
discrimination
cases
civil rights
cases

The estimated lower bounds are large. For total other cases, the lower
bound is 21.5 percentage points.183 This suggests that the switch from Conley to
Iqbal caused MTD movants to prevail—and thus plaintiffs to be negatively
affected—on one or more claims in at least 21.5% of cases in which MTDs were
adjudicated in the FJC’s Iqbal study period. Recall from Table that movants
prevailed in 56.3% of MTDs filed against total other cases in the FJC’s Iqbal
period. So another way to interpret my lower bound is that nearly two-fifths
(21.5 ÷ 56.3 = 0.38) of cases with MTDs granted in the Iqbal period as to some

183.

This estimate is statistically significant, as are the estimates of my lower bound for the
employment discrimination and civil rights case categories, discussed infra. For details, see
Appendix B, available at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/documents/gelbach
_appendix_b.pdf
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claims would not have had MTDs granted had the pleading regime not
changed.184
For employment discrimination cases, my lower bound on the negatively
affected share is 15.4 percentage points. Thus, at least a fourth of the 61.1% of
employment discrimination cases in which movants prevail in the Iqbal period
had plaintiffs who were negatively affected as a result of the switch from Conley
to Twombly/Iqbal. Among civil rights cases, the lower bound on the negatively
affected share is 18.1 percentage points. The movant-prevails rate in the Iqbal
period was 68.1% for civil rights cases, so—as with employment discrimination
cases—at least a fourth of civil rights cases in which movants prevailed under
Twombly/Iqbal had MTDs granted because of the switch from Conley to
Twombly/Iqbal.
Why are my lower bounds so much greater than simple differences in
grant rates across pleading regimes? Because there is so much selection. What
drives the large correction terms in Table 5 is the fact that the increases in the
number of MTDs filed were sizable relative to the number of MTDs filed in the
Iqbal period. As I discussed at the end of Section V.D, the cross-pleading
regime differences will be particularly far below my lower bound on the
negatively affected share when this happens.
Interestingly, the correction term is smallest for civil rights cases, and
smaller for employment discrimination cases than for total other cases. This
pattern suggests less selection for civil rights and employment discrimination
cases. One explanation for this finding is that these case types had greater
MTD filing rates than did other cases under Conley. Table 3 shows that the
MTD filing rate for employment discrimination cases under Conley was more
than double the rate for total other cases, while the corresponding rate for civil
rights cases was more than triple that for total other cases. Perhaps, then, there
was simply less room for a large defendant selection effect among civil rights
and employment discrimination cases than among others, since defendants
were already challenging the sufficiency of these cases relatively frequently.
Whatever the reason for the pattern of results, though, they leave open the
possibility that civil rights and employment discrimination cases have not been
more negatively affected than other cases.

184.

It is critical to remember, from Part III, that some of these negatively affected cases would
not have faced MTDs at all had the Conley pleading standard governed instead.
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B. Potential Threats to the Validity of My Empirical Results
In this Section, I discuss two ways my methodology might go wrong as an
empirical matter. The first is that the number of underlying controversies
might have grown, or other characteristics might have changed. The second
has to do with the way the FJC collected its data. I discuss these issues in turn.
1. Instability or Growth in the Set of Underlying Controversies
There are exogenous and endogenous ways that the set of underlying
controversies might have changed between the Conley and Iqbal study periods.
On the exogenous side, perhaps the number of underlying controversies just
grows at a fixed rate every year (say, due to population or economic growth).
In this case, I would tend to overstate the correction term in equation (2). That
is true because the number of MTDs filed in the Iqbal period would rise simply
due to the passage of time, rather than because of party selection effects,
inflating my correction term.185
Perhaps some of the increase in the number of MTDs filed in employment
discrimination and civil rights cases might come from such an exogenousgrowth source.186 But it seems very unlikely that exogenous growth in
controversies can explain much of the lower bound for the total other cases
nature-of-suit category. For this category, the rate at which MTDs were filed
increased from 3.1% to 5.0% of case filings,187 which is more than a 60%
increase,188 while the overall number of cases filed in the total other cases
category actually fell slightly between the Conley and Iqbal study periods.189

185.

186.

187.
188.
189.

To see this, recall that the correction term equals the product of the Conley grant rate and the
ratio of the change in the number of MTDs filed to the number of MTDs filed under Iqbal.
The Conley grant rate would not be affected by an across-the-board increase in the number
of controversies. But such an increase would cause the latter ratio to rise, causing me to
overstate my correction term.
For these nature-of-suit categories, the number of cases filed did actually rise. See supra text
accompanying note 168. One interesting possibility is that case filings respond to the
business cycle, which swung down substantially between 2005-2006 and 2009-2010; see
Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 130, for a discussion of the cyclical aspects of employment
discrimination litigation.
See supra Table 3.
That is, 5.0% - 3.1% = 1.9%, and 1.9% ÷ 3.1% = 0.613.
See supra Table 3.
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This pattern seems to suggest party selection, not exogenous growth, as the
primary driver of my results.
In principle, my results could also be affected by changes in the number of
controversies that result from endogenous primary-behavior responses to
changes in pleading policy. After the switch from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal,
repeat-player defendants—like, say, large employers—might believe
themselves less likely to face lawsuits, and less likely to have to bear discovery
burdens when they do. They might thus engage in more discrimination, or be
less vigilant in policing any unlawful behavior of supervisors, or worry less
about strike suits. Such primary-behavior responses would induce additional
lawsuits over and above what would happen in the primary-behavior baseline.
One of the facts of life for nonexperimental empirical research, though, is
that there are always such potential counterexplanations. At present I do not
know of a good way to test either the exogenous or endogenous growth stories.
Perhaps future research will be able to address them.
2. Are the FJC’s Data Useful?
In commenting on the original FJC MTD report, the then-Chair of the
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules, Judge Mark Kravitz, suggested that
results from the FJC’s filing and grants data sets should not be used together:
A succinct but potentially misleading statement of the central
finding would be that the rate of filing 12(b)(6) motions has increased,
while the rate of granting the motions [has] held constant. A natural
conclusion would be that a constant rate of granting an increased
number of motions means that more cases are dismissed for failure to
state a claim. But the comparison is made between two data sets, and it
is difficult to confirm or deny this possible conclusion.190
But the fact that two data sets are involved does not by itself suggest there
is any problem with using the FJC’s data together. Empirical researchers make
comparisons using multiple data sets all the time—across time, across surveys,
across geographical areas, and so on. While there could be fatal inconsistencies
between data sets, I do not believe the two FJC MTD reports contain any
concrete reasons for concern.

190.

Memorandum from Hon. Mark R. Kravitz, supra note 19, at 53.

2337

the yale law journal

121:2270

2012

In personal communication with me, the lead author of the FJC reports, Joe
Cecil, has stated that the FJC does “regard these data sets as too inconsistent to
yield a valid estimate of a combined effect.”191 The FJC’s concern here
presumably is that its grant study is based on a cross section of judicial orders
filed during a fixed window of time, rather than a cohort study of orders that
flow from the set of cases and Rule 12(b)(6) MTDs filed during the periods
corresponding to the filing study. For such differences in data collection
methods to be important, there would have to be substantial compositional
differences between the sets of cases that are filed in the nine months following
October 1 and those cases that are at risk of having a judicial order issued in the
six months after the following January. But the FJC does not provide any
concrete reason to think this is actually the case.
An additional potential problem is that some cases with MTDs adjudicated
in the Iqbal period might have been filed before Iqbal, or even before Twombly,
if the cases have had enough amended complaints. Consequently, the cross
section of orders that the FJC analyzed might not fully represent the steady
state that will ultimately develop over time. These are standard concerns when
one compares cross sections of dynamic processes that are sampled on either
side of a policy change.
I would certainly prefer a cohort-based measure that followed a fixed set of
cases from their filing, to the filing of initial Rule 12(b)(6) MTDs, and then
over the period necessary to determine who ultimately prevails on these initial
motions. But given that no such measure currently exists, I believe that the
comprehensive and representative nature of the FJC’s cross section is the best
currently available alternative. In addition, my hunch is that whatever the
compositional mismatch in the cases represented by the FJC’s cross section of
orders and its cohort of filed cases, it is unlikely to greatly affect my lower
bounds’ values.
For a large amount of such mismatch to occur, the characteristics of cases in
the cross section on which the FJC’s grants study is based must look very
different from the characteristics of cases that would appear in a longitudinal
sample of cases with judicial orders resolving Rule 12(b)(6) MTDs. Given that
most MTD adjudication will happen early in a case’s lifetime,192 such

191.
192.

E-mail from Joe Cecil, Lead Author, FJC Report, to author (Dec. 5, 2011, 11:22 AM EST) (on
file with author).
Rule 12(a)(1) states that in the absence of a contrary rule or federal statute, a defendant
“must serve an answer: (i) within 21 days after being served with the summons and
complaint.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A). If the defendant has timely waived service under
Rule 4(d), then this period extends to 60 days after the request for a waiver (90 days if such
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differences seem unlikely. Of course, I could be wrong about the facts. The FJC
could provide some guidance on this point by releasing some information
about the filing dates of cases included in its grants study.193 Fortunately, Cecil
has told me that the FJC plans to release its data within the next several
months.194
Finally, I must say that I find the FJC’s position on this issue puzzling.
Does the FJC really believe that the cross sections from which its grants data
were drawn are importantly unrepresentative of the cohorts of cases filed
before and after Twombly/Iqbal? If so, why did the FJC commence work on its
reports in the first place? And why did it release either report to the public?
The original report declares that “this study was designed to assess changes in
motions to dismiss and decisions on such motions over time in broad
categories of civil cases.”195 How can one “assess changes” from a data set if the
observations it contains on the two time periods it covers cannot be compared?
In sum, while I of course respect both Judge Kravitz’s and the FJC’s
position on these points, I do not believe that either has made a convincing

193.

194.
195.

request was sent to the defendant outside the United States). FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(ii).
There are good reasons why a failure-to-state-a-claim defense can be expected to be raised
before such date as an answer is served. Without an order dismissing a plaintiff’s claims, a
defendant will be susceptible to discovery. Therefore, asserting failure to state a claim as
part of an answer, as Rule 12(h)(2) allows, FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(2), does not stop the
discovery clock. A defendant who answers a complaint still does retain the option of
asserting failure to state a claim as a defense as part of a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on
the pleadings. Such a motion might be adjudicated before discovery, but it also might not.
Similarly, a protective order under Rule 26 might be granted, but it also might not. As a
general rule then, defendants looking to avoid discovery will assert the failure-to-state-aclaim defense in Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which “must be made before pleading if a
responsive pleading is allowed.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b). Thus, we can expect the MTDs
relevant to this discussion to be filed early in the litigation.
On this point, Cecil informed me as part of our e-mail communication that “many of the
orders [the FJC uses] to estimate the post-Iqbal grant rate were from cases filed before Iqbal
was decided, and even more were filed before the appellate court provided guidance to the
district courts.” E-mail from Joe Cecil to author, supra note 191. Unfortunately, I do not
know how many “many” is, which is important because the FJC’s post-Iqbal sample is quite
large, containing 1200 orders. Moreover, this is problematic only to the extent that
amendment behavior, and subsequent MTD filing, differs importantly as a result of
Twombly and Iqbal. Cecil has suggested to me that party selection effects of the type I
consider in this Note can be expected to change amendment and subsequent MTD-filing
behavior following Twombly and Iqbal. Perhaps. But these points of conjecture can be settled
only with data that only the FJC has as of this writing.
Id.
CECIL ET AL., supra note 10, at 1.
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argument against using the data from the FJC’s two studies in the way that I
do. I will certainly be prepared to revise my view should future reasons or
evidence come to light on this point, and I look forward to having a chance to
assess the FJC’s full data set firsthand.
vii. questions for future investigation
By taking party selection seriously, this Note begins to fill an important gap
in the existing empirical literature on Twombly and Iqbal. A key remaining
question concerns the merits of cases in which plaintiffs have been negatively
affected due to Twombly and Iqbal. A substantial negatively affected share
might be socially desirable, if affected cases have low enough merit. This would
especially be true if affected cases tend to involve the kind of substantial
discovery expense that motivated the Supreme Court’s Twombly and Iqbal
opinions.
I hope to use data on the adjudication of defense summary-judgment
motions to attack the low-merit question. One can view Twombly, and Iqbal by
extension, as asking judges to forecast the results of discovery and thus the
likely outcome of defense summary-judgment motions.196 If judges are
successful at this task, then cases that would have gone through discovery and
been dismissed pursuant to defense summary-judgment motions under Conley
will now be dismissed before discovery at the MTD stage. This culling of weak
cases will tend to reduce defendants’ win rate in summary judgment motions.
Thus, determining whether this win rate has fallen, and if so by how much,
might provide important evidence on the quality of cases affected by Twombly
and Iqbal. Future conceptual and empirical work based on summary judgment
motions might well bear fruit, and this is a topic on which I am currently
engaged.

196.

Justice Souter said as much in Twombly: “Asking for plausible grounds to infer an [illegal
non-compete] agreement . . . calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 556 (2007). For an example of this idea in action, see Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v.
Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1309 (2011), which held that plaintiffs had “adequately pleaded
materiality” in the securities fraud context because their complaint’s allegations “suffice to
‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence’” that the defendant firm
had failed to disclose information that a reasonable investor would want to know, which
would be sufficient to establish the plaintiffs’ claim if unrebutted. Id. at 1322-23 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
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That said, as scholars and policymakers debate possibilities for further
pleading reform, it is important to keep in mind that empirical evidence can tell
one only so much. This is true partly because not every positive question can be
answered with data, and partly because many of the key judgments about
access to discovery, and the resulting balance of power between plaintiffs and
defendants, are fundamentally normative. Even so, it would be a mistake to
look at the positive and normative questions in isolation. When considering
potential reforms to pleading and discovery, we must understand which types
of plaintiffs will be able to cross the threshold to discovery, and which will find
its door barred.
conclusion
In this Note, I discuss the interplay between party selection effects, changes
in MTD grant rates, and heightened pleading. A key negative result is that the
conventional focus on changes in MTD grant rates after Twombly and Iqbal
tells us relatively little about how Twombly and Iqbal have affected fixed sets of
cases. While others have pointed out the possibility of party selection effects,
few observers of Twombly and Iqbal seem to have grasped the empirical
importance of accounting for party selection when measuring the impact of
changes in pleading standards. Moreover, selection does not just complicate
judicial-behavior-effect measurement—it has direct effects, too.
On the positive side of the ledger, this Note makes several constructive
contributions. First, I develop a measure of the share of cases that face MTDs
under Twombly/Iqbal in which plaintiffs are negatively affected by the switch
from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal. Negatively affected cases are those that do not
get to discovery following a Rule 12(b)(6) MTD filing under Twombly/Iqbal,
given that these cases either would have gotten to discovery or would have
settled had the Conley pleading regime been in place. Second, I show how to
use real-world data to calculate a lower bound on this measure, even though
the measure itself is unobservable.
Third, I actually estimate this lower bound for each of three nature-of-suit
categories. My estimates imply that, among cases not involving financial
instruments, civil rights, or employment discrimination, Twombly and Iqbal
negatively affected at least 21.5% of cases that faced a Rule 12(b)(6) MTD
during the post-Iqbal period. Estimated lower bounds for employment
discrimination and civil rights cases are a bit lower, at 15.4% and 18.1%
respectively. These would be substantial effects in their own right, and the fact
that they are lower bounds tells us that the full effects may be even greater.
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appendix a: raw case counts
Appendix A Table 1 lists the numbers of cases filed by plaintiffs in each of
the FJC’s filing study periods, by detailed nature-of-suit category.
Appendix A, Table 1.

number of cases filed by plaintiffs
case type
Total
Financial Instruments
Employment Discrimination
Civil Rights as defined in FJC reports
Sum of ADA Civil Rights
ADA – Employment
ADA – Other
Sum of non-ADA Civil Rights
Civil Rights – Welfare
Civil Rights – Voting
Civil Rights – Accommodations
Civil Rights – Other
Sum of “Financial Instruments,”
“Employment Discrimination,” &
all “Civil Rights”
Total, excluding “Financial
Instruments,” “Employment
Discrimination,” & all “Civil Rights”

2342

october 1, 2005 –
june 30, 2006
49,443
1524
3795
4212
717
268
449
3495
9
35
169
3282

october 1, 2009 –
june 30, 2010
52,925
4790
3871
4976
1229
378
851
3747
9
18
153
3567

9531

13,637

39,912

39,288
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Notes to Appendix A, Table 1:







Figures for “Total,” “Financial Instruments,” and “Employment
Discrimination” rows come from CECIL ET AL., supra note 10, at 9
tbl.1.
Figures for the following rows come from supplemental tables
provided to author by Joe Cecil (on file with author): ADA –
Employment; ADA – Other; Civil Rights – Accommodations;
Civil Rights – Voting; Civil Rights – Welfare; Civil Rights –
Other.
Figures in rows with bold font—“Employment Discrimination,”
“Sum of Non-ADA Civil Rights,” and “Total, excluding ‘Financial
Instruments,’ ‘Employment Discrimination’ & all ‘Civil Rights’”—
are those used in columns (1) and (4) of Table 3 of the main text.
Note that Cecil et al., supra note 10, at 9 tbl. 1, states that there are
4214 rather than 4212 cases in the FJC’s “Civil Rights” category for
the earlier period.

Appendix A Table 2 constructs the implied number of Rule 12(b)(6) MTDs
filed in the FJC’s “Total” category and in the financial instruments category. I
use these figures subsequently in Appendix A Table 3.
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Appendix A, Table 2.

deriving the implied number of cases with rule 12(b)(6) mtds filed by
defendants within first 90 days of case filing, select categories

case type

october 1, 2005 – june 30, 2006
number
share
implied
of cases
with
number
plaintiffs 12(b)(6)
of mtds
filed
mtds

october 1, 2009 – june 30, 2010
number
share
implied
of cases
with
number
plaintiffs
12(b)(6)
of mtds
filed
mtds

total

49,443

4.0%

1978

52,925

6.2%

3281

financial
instruments

1524

4.3%

66

4790

9.6%

460

Notes to Appendix A, Table 2:



Entries in columns titled “Number of Cases Plaintiffs Filed” and
“Share with 12(b)(6) MTDs” come from Cecil et al., supra note 10,
at 9 tbl.1.
Entries in columns titled “Implied Number of MTDs” are products
of entries in corresponding “Number of Cases Plaintiffs Filed” and
“Share with 12(b)(6) MTDs” columns.

Appendix A Table 3 lists the number of cases, either actual or implied from
other data, that have Rule 12(b)(6) MTDs filed by defendants within the first
90 days of case filing.
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Appendix A, Table 3.

number of cases with rule 12(b)(6) mtds filed by defendants within
first 90 days of case filing
case type
Total

october 1, 2005 –
june 30, 2006

october 1, 2009 –
june 30, 2010

1978

3281

Financial Instruments

66

460

Employment Discrimination

262

349

Civil Rights as defined in FJC reports

409

505

Sum of ADA Civil Rights

33

51

ADA – Employment

16

32

ADA – Other

17

19

376

454

Civil Rights – Welfare

2

2

Civil Rights – Voting

3

2

13
358

6
444

Sum of “Financial Instruments,”
“Employment Discrimination,” &
all “Civil Rights”

737

1313

Total, excluding “Financial
Instruments,” “Employment
Discrimination,” & all
“Civil Rights”

1241

1968

Sum of non-ADA Civil Rights

Civil Rights – Accommodations
Civil Rights – Other

2345

the yale law journal

121:2270

2012

Notes to Appendix A, Table 3:





Figures in rows with bold font—“Employment Discrimination,”
“Sum of Non-ADA Civil Rights,” and “Total, excluding ‘Financial
Instruments,’ ‘Employment Discrimination’ & all ‘Civil Rights’”—
are those used in main text.
Figures for “Total” and “Financial Instruments” rows come from
column labeled “Implied Number, MTDs” in Appendix A Table 2.
Figures for the following rows come from supplemental tables
provided to author by Joe Cecil (on file with author):
“Employment Discrimination;” “ADA – Employment;” “ADA –
Other;” “Civil Rights – Accommodations;” “Civil Rights –
Voting;” “Civil Rights – Welfare;” “Civil Rights – Other.”

Appendix A Table 4 lists the number of cases with Rule 12(b)(6) MTDs in
which each party ultimately prevailed, among cases with judicial orders
resolving Rule 12(b)(6) MTDs filed during the FJC’s study periods. All figures
are based on supplemental tables provided to author by Joe Cecil on December
7, 2011 (on file with author).197

197.

Figures for “Total,” “Employment Discrimination,” and “Financial Instruments” columns
are also reported in CECIL ET AL., supra note 11, at 7 tbl.A-1. There is one substantial
discrepancy between Table A-1 of the updated FJC report and the figures Cecil provided me:
Table A-1 of the updated report lists 216 financial-instruments cases in which the movant
prevails, whereas the December 7, 2011, tables list 151 instead. Cecil has specifically
confirmed that the 151 figure is correct. See E-Mail from Joe Cecil, Lead Author, FJC Report,
to author (Jan. 26, 2012, 2:48 PM EST) (on file with author).
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Appendix A, Table 4.

number of cases with rule 12(b)(6) mtds in which movant or respondent
ultimately prevailed, among cases with judicial orders resolving rule
12(b)(6) mtds filed between january 1 to june 30 of indicated year
case type

2006

2010

respondent

movant

total

respondent

movant

total

Total

297

384

681

414

697

1111

Financial
Instruments

10

6

16

39

151

190

Employment
Discrimination

36

56

92

44

69

113

“Civil Rights” as
defined in
FJC reports

70

99

169

69

140

209

Sum of ADA
Civil Rights

8

5

13

8

10

18

ADA –
Employment

2

2

4

3

6

9

ADA – Other

6

3

9

5

4

9

Non-ADA
Civil Rights

62

94

156

61

130

191

Sum of “Financial
Instruments,”
“Employment
Discrimination,” &
all “Civil Rights”

116

161

277

152

360

512

Total, excluding
“Financial
Instruments,”
“Employment
Discrimination,” &
all “Civil Rights”

181

223

404

262

337

599
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Notes to Appendix A, Table 4:
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Figures in rows with bold font—“Employment Discrimination,”
“Non-ADA Civil Rights,” and “Total, excluding ‘Financial
Instruments,’ ‘Employment Discrimination’ & all ‘Civil Rights’”—
are those used to calculate the rate at which movants ultimately
prevail, reported in Table 4 of main text.
Figures reported in Table 4 of main text are ratio of “Movant”
column of the present table to the corresponding “Total” column
of the present table. For example, the present table shows that
employment discrimination movants prevailed in 56 of 92 orders,
for a rate of 56 divided by 92, or 60.1%, which is the figure
reported in the bottom left cell of Table 4 of the main text.

